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LEGAL ASPECTS: EXPLOITATION
OF ANTARCTIC RESOURCES
A Recommended Approach to the Antarctic
Resource Problem*
FRANK C. ALEXANDER, JR.**
As existing resource reserves dwindle, exploration in areas
once considered to be beyond feasible exploitation is now being
examined much more closely. The author suggests that the
southern polar region is one such area ripe for future develop-
ment. Since Antarctica lacks a political administration, however,
problems arise concerning sovereignty rights over its resources.
Claims of historical entitlement must be reconciled with the
demands of the international community for general recognition
to be realized. Currently, a treaty exists among states interested
in Antarctica which is concerned primarily with the continued
use of the continent for peaceful scientific investigation. Al-
though the Antarctic Treaty provides a framework for a struc-
tured development scheme, it conspiciously fails to address the
resource-sovereignty issue. The author proposes a plan which as-
similates the existing Antarctic Treaty composition while resolv-
ing the polemic interests of states asserting territorial claims in
the Antarctic and of the remainder of the world community.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, Antarctica was generally considered to be little
more than a massive oddity on the earth's crust. Cold, inhospitable
and surrounded by the globe's most dangerous ice-filled seas, the
continent was known only as a great hazard for intrepid adventurers
and a gigantic natural laboratory for a few hardy scientists. Those
treasures which might lie hidden beneath its mile-thick ice cap were
not considered worth the trouble of investigation.
Today, however, many states of the world are intrigued with the
offshore natural resource potential of Antarctica. Unfortunately, at
the present time there is no established legal order governing re-
source exploration and exploitation in Antarctica.
Although seven states have made actual sovereignty claims to
various "sectors" of the Antarctic continent,' none of these claims
enjoys general recognition. Additionally, the United States, and the
Soviet Union3 have "interests" in Antarctica, but neither has yet
made any movement towards formalizing a claim of sovereignty.
The Antarctic Treaty of 19591 effectively demilitarizes Antarc-
tica and establishes the continent as a "science preserve" among the
signatory states. The Treaty, however, is not binding upon the non-
signatory states which constitute most of the world community.
1. The seven claimant states, in the chronological order in which they asserted their
claims, are Britain, New Zealand, Australia, France, Norway, Chile and Argentina. These
claims are more fully described in notes 17-24 and accompanying text infra.
2. The American "interest" stems from early expeditions to Antarctica, supplemented
by a continuing presence thereafter. See notes 32-33 and accompanying text infra.
3. Russian involvement is predicated upon discoveries dating back to 1819. See notes 35-
37 and accompanying text infra. Other international interests in and contacts with Antarctica
are considered in notes 17-31 and accompanying text infra.
4. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71
(entered into force June 23, 1961) [hereinafter cited as Antarctic Treaty or Treaty].
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Moreover, it conspicuously fails to address the issue of resource
activity within Antarctica.
The legal and political vacuum pertaining to potential resource
exploitation has combined with the increasing pressures on the
states of the world to initiate resource activities in Antarctica to
create the Antarctic resource problem. A solution to this problem
must be found soon if the current possibility of conflict over Antarc-
tic offshore natural resources is to be reduced. In all probability,
only a unique approach will solve the difficulties inherent in at-
tempting to establish an internationally acceptable legal order for
this unique continent. This article attempts to develop an approach
which realistically evaluates the competing needs and interests of
the international community and which will enable a viable initia-
tion of Antarctic resource development in the near future.
II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Terra Australis Nondum Cognita, the unknown land in the
south, was a purely theoretical concept for over two thousand years.
Greek philosophers of the Aristotelian school had determined that
if the earth were indeed a sphere, there would have to be a consider-
able land mass in the south to counterbalance the Eurasian land
mass in the north.5 These teachings, however, were renounced by
the early Christian Church as heresy.' It was not until after Magel-
lan's circumnavigation of the globe, which confirmed the Greek
prediction that the earth was spherical, that European cartogra-
phers adopted the Aristotelian theory postulating the existence of a
southern antipode.'
From the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, many unsuccessful
attempts were made to find the theoretical southern continent., In
1795, Captain James Cook undertook such a maritime endeavor,
but he too failed to find an Antarctic continent. Cook did, however,
5. See I. CAMERON, ANTARCTICA: THE LAST CONTINENT 21 (1974); cf. W. SULLIVAN, QUEST
FOR A CONTINENT 21 (ancient Greeks' search for symmetry led them to theorize four continents
evenly distributed over the globe). The Greeks were also instrumental in the coining of the
word "Antarctic." They named the constellation above the North Pole Arktos (The Bear).
That term was later applied to the northern polar region. Arktos was modified to "Arctic"
and "Anti-Arctic," or the region opposite the Arctic, was modified to "Antarctica." I. CAM-
ERON, supra, at 21.
6. Religious leaders felt that the existence of a southern landmass could well mean that
an independent human population also existed. Since the equator was thought to be a zone
of impassible heat, the possibility that such a population existed was irreconcilable with the
postulate that all human beings were descended from Adam through Noah. I. CAMERON, supra
note 5, at 22-23.
7. Id. at 23; cf. W. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 21 (the Renaissance rekindled the notion
of an immense continent covering almost the entire southern portion of the world).
8. See, e.g., W. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 21-34.
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circumnavigate the world at a high southern latitude proving, at
least, that the "unknown land in the south" could not be as gigantic
as had been supposed.'
The question of who first discovered Antarctica is still unre-
solved. 0 American historians claim it was a New England sealer
named Nathaniel Palmer, while the British contend it was Edward
Bransfield of the Royal Navy. Actually, the first to sight the main-
land may well have been Thaddeus von Bellingshausen of the Impe-
rial Russian Navy, sometime between 1819 and 1821 during an expe-
dition in search of the South Pole.
In 1895, the introduction of the Suen Foyd harpoon gun marked
the start of successful Antarctic whaling and many vessels began to
ply the waters of the Southern Ocean. 2 By 1904, Scott was exploring
the interior of Antarctica by dog sled. 3 On December 14, 1911,
Amundsen of Norway reached the South Pole.'4 By 1929, Admiral
Byrd had flown over the South Pole, 5 and he explored much of
Antarctica in a series of expeditions between 1928 and 1947.11
In the early twentieth century, states began to assert territorial
sovereignty claims in Antarctica. Beginning with Britain in 1908,11
several countries made "sector claims."' 8 During the years between
1923 and 1940, sector claims, many of which overlapped, were as-
9. H. KING, THE ANTARCTIC 200 (1972). In his journal, Captain Cook commented: "[If
anyone should have the resolution and perserverence to clear-up this point [the existence of
Antarctica], by proceeding farther than I have done, I shall not envy him the honor of the
discovery; but I will be bold to say that the world will not be profited by it." Id. at 18.
10. See Gould, Antarctica in World Affairs, 128 HEADLINE SEi. 3, 12-18 (1958); Sullivan,
Antarctica in a Two-power World, 36 FOREIGN Aw. 154, 155 (1957).
11. See I. CAMERON, supra note 5, at 17-18. But see Gould, supra note 10, at 18 (suggest-
ing that the first sighting was a Nantucket whaling captain named Christopher Burdick). See
generally L. MourrvANs, THE ANTaRc CHALENGED 12-18 (1956); W. SULLIVAN, supra note
5, at 21-26.
12. See I. CAMERON, supra note 5, at 245.
13. See C. GRATTAN, THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC SINCE 1900, at 561-77 (1963). For a detailed
account of Captain Scott's second and last expedition, see L. HUYLEY, SCOTT'S LAST
EXPEDITION (1957).
14. I. CAMERON, supra note 5, at 245; C. GRATTAN, supra note 13, at 579.
15. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1929, at 1, col. 4. For a detailed account of the flight, including
narratives by Admiral Byrd, see W. JOERG, THE WORK OF THE BYRD ANTARCTIC EXPEDITION
1928-1930, at 34-51 (1930).
16. See 1. CAMERON, supra note 5, at 246. See generally R. BYRD, DISCOVERY (1935); W.
JOERG, supra note 15; W. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 79-109.
17. The political history of Antarctica began on July 21, 1908, when a claim was asserted
to an area known as Graham Land. The Governor of the Falkland Islands was entrusted with
the administration of the Antarctic claim on behalf of the British Crown. J. KISH, THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL SPACES 29 (1973).
18. To determine the boundaries of these sector claims, an angle is drawn from the South
Pole, and all the territory within the sector, including a measure of adjacent water, is claimed
by the asserting sovereign.
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serted by the governments of New Zealand,"9 Australia," France,2'
Norway,"2 Argentina 3 and Chile.24 The United States= and the So-
viet Union 2 protested such claims and refused to recognize any
claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
Other countries have exhibited varying degrees of interest in
Antarctic territory short of actual formal claims. Belgium has in-
dicated an interest based on its scientific' expedition in 1897-99.27
Japan made some "vague nonspecific claims" during a 1911-12 ex-
pedition but has since renounced such claims.28 Nazi Germany took
substantial steps toward an assertion of Antarctic territorial sover-
19. On July 30, 1923, New Zealand claimed sovereignty over the Ross dependency.
Gould, supra note 10, at 23.
20. The Australian claim to two sectors of Antarctica was asserted on February 7, 1933,
by British Order in Council. These two sectors, Wilkes Land and Victoria Land, are bisected
by Adelie Land, the sector which France claims. J. KISH, supra note 17, at 29. For a detailed
history of Australian exploration in Antarctica, see A. SCHOLES, SEVENTH CONTINENT (1953).
21. On March 27, 1924, France laid claim to Adelie Land based upon discoveries made
by the French explorer Dumont d'Urville around the year 1840. Gould, supra note 10, at 23.
In 1938, when France announced its claim by official decree, it received recognition by the
British. This was in exchange for a French guarantee which granted Great Britain the right
to fly over Adelie Land. J. KISH, supra note 17, at 29.
22. Norway asserted a sector claim over an area called the Maud Land on January 14,
1939. 'J. KISH, supra note 17, at 29.
23. Argentina communicated its territorial claim to Britain on November 30, 1925.
Gould, supra note 10, at 23. A 1927 statement to the Universal Postal Union, however, was
probably the first official announcement of an Antarctic claim by Argentina. Hayton, The
"American" Antarctic, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 583, 587 (1956). In 1942, the Primero de Mayo
Argentine expedition proclaimed the annexation of all territory within the sector of longitude
250 W. and 68°34"W. Commemorative plaques were placed on Deception and Wiencke
Islands, although no official decree was issued confirming this claim. The later removal of
these plaques by the British caused considerable diplomatic friction between the two coun-
tries. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE AND THE ANTARCTIC ANALOGY
146-47 (1959).
24. On November 6, 1940, Chile issued a decree claiming an Antarctic sector which
included part of a sector previously claimed by Great Britain. J. KISH, supra note 17, at 29.
25. The official United States position on sector claims in Antarctica was announced in
1924 by the Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes: "It is the opinion of this department
that the discovery of lands unknown to civilization, even when coupled with the formal taking
of possession, does not support a valid claim of sovereignty unless the discovery is followed
by actual settlement of the discovered country." Gould, supra note 10, at 21.
26. See J. KISH, supra note 17, at 30.
27. See P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 23, at 158: cf. Hanessian, Antarctica:
Current National Interests and Legal Realities, 1958 PRoc. AM. Soc'v INT'L L. 153 (Belgium
government expectation, based on its discoveries during the expedition of 1897-99, to be
included in any international discussions concerning the future political status of Antarctica).
28. Japan had successfully explored several Antarctic regions in 1912 without asserting
any specific territorial claims. Hanessian, supra note 27, at 154 n.23. Any inchoate Japanese
claims were formally renounced on Sept. 8, 1951, in the peace treaty signed with the Allied
Powers: "Japan renounces all claims to any right or title to or interest in connection with
any part of the Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or
otherwise." Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, art.II(e), 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No.
2490, 136 U.N.T.S. 165.
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eignty," but neither East nor West Germany has thus far made a
derivative claim.30 Brazil, Uruguay and Peru have also expressed
what might be termed a marginal interest in Antarctica.'
Although the United States has never made a formal claim to
Antarctica or recognized any claims by other states, it has always
reserved the right to assert such a claim. 32 American activities have
been motivated, at least at times, by sovereignty concerns.3 In fact,
the United States may be generally acknowledged to have some sort
of inchoate proprietary interest in the area known as Byrd Land,
resulting from unofficial claims to the area made on behalf of the
United States by Admiral Byrd in 1929 and by others involved in
subsequent expeditions. 4
The Soviet Union has as yet made no formal sovereignty claim
to Antarctica but, like the United States, has reserved the right to
do so. 35 Soviet interests in Antarctica are based upon the discoveries
29. See W. SuIwVA, surpa note 5, at 124-27. The Nazi exploration in 1938-39 was carried
out by seaplanes launched from a catapult ship and resulted in the mapping of some 300,000
square miles of Antarctica. Steel markers with the Nazi emblem were dropped every 15 to 20
miles to provide a basis for the Nazi claim. P. JEssuP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 23, at
157.
30. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFEWL, supra note 23, at 157. The German Democratic Republic
has since acceded to the Antarctic Treaty. See note 64 infra.
31. See id. at 158. Prior to 1959, these three countries apparently considered making
claims in Antarctica. The basis of these claims would be a projection of their boundaries
poleward. Thus far, however, they have not made any formal sovereignty claims. Id. Brazil
has acceded to the Antarctic Treaty. See note 64 infra.
32. Members of the. United States Antarctic Service were told by President Roosevelt in
1939 that they could take and record any appropriate acts which might later assist the United
States in supporting a sovereignty claim. Public announcement of such activity, however, was
forbidden without specific permission from the Secretary of State. Hayton, Polar Problems
and International Law, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 746, 762-63 (1958). See generally Gould, supra note
10, at 27-28.
33. Originally secret directives for three United States Navy expeditions, Operations
High Jump (1946), Windmill (1947) and Deepfreeze 1 (1955), listed "extension and consolida-
tion of 'United States sovereignty over the largest practicable area of the Antarctic conti-
nent'" as among their objectives. Hayton, supra note 32, at 763; see P. JEssuP & H. TAUBEN-
FELD, supra note 23, at 155-56. References to strengthening territorial claims were omitted
from the specific objectives of Operation Deepfreeze for 1956-57 pursuant to a "gentlemens'
agreement" that no activities undertaken during the International Geophysical Year (I.G.Y.)
would be used as a basis for political objectives. Operation Deepfreeze was initiated to install
United States scientific stations for the I.G.Y. Sullivan, supra note 10, at 160.
34. See P. JEssuP & H. TAUBEMF'nn, supra note 23, at 153-54. Byrd Land is an area that
was first explored and claimed by Admiral Richard Byrd in 1929. See generally W. JOERG,
supra note 15; Gould, supra note 10, at 26-27. The Ellsworth expedition in 1935-36 also made
claims for the United States. On July 1, 1930, Senator Tydings unsuccessfully introduced a
resolution which would have resulted in an American sovereignty claim to all lands in Antarc-
tica discovered or explored by American citizens. P. JEssuP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 23,
at 154.
35. See generally Tome, Soviet Attitude Toward The Acquisition of Territorial Sover-
eignty in the Antarctic, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1956).
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of Bellingshausen and Lazarev.35 The Soviets contend that the lapse
of 130 years does not in any way result in the diminution of those
interests. 7
In the years following World War II, both the United States
3
and the Soviet Union" unsuccessfully attempted to initiate discus-
sions aimed at establishing an international regime in Antarctica."
After years of failing to resolve a dispute with Chile and Argentina
over conflicting sovereignty claims," England adopted a policy call-
ing for the internationalization of the Antarctic. 2 The internation-
alization question was brought to the attention of the world com-
munity by proposals calling for a worldwide accord from the govern-
ment of India to the United Nations General Assembly in 195613 and
again in 1958."1
Any notion of international cooperation in Antarctica can trace
its conception to the International Geophysical Year (I.G.Y.), which
36. See generally notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
37. P. JEssu, & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 23, at 157. See also Toma, supra note 35, at
623.
38. J. KISH, supra note 17, at 76; cf. Gould, supra note 10, at 29-30 (effects of the Cold
War on American involvement in Antarctica). See generally C. GRArrAN, supra note 13, at
669-71.
39. See J. KISH, supra note 17, at 76-77. The Soviet position on internationalization
seems to have changed between 1949 and 1950. A 1949 memorandum by the U.S.S.R. Geo-
graphical Society drew a distinction between states having an "historical right to territorial
claims" in Antarctica and other interested states without such a right, while a 1950 Soviet
memorandum spoke in terms of "all countries concerned." See Memorandum of the Soviet
Government on the Question of the Regime of the Antarctic (June 7, 1950) and Resolution of
the All-Soviet Geographical Society of February 10, 1949, reprinted in Toms, supra note 35,
at 624-26 app.
40. Cf. C. GRArrA, supra note 13, at 661 (prior to 1959, only New Zealand had developed
an international approach toward Antarctica).
41. The Antarctic territorial claims which Chile and Argentina asserted overlapped each
other by some 21° . Both of these claims, in turn, overlap Great Britain's claim in the Palmer
Peninsula region. Gould, supra note 10, at 23. During the decade following World War II, the
differences between these three countries were clearly manifested in a competition to main-
tain and establish bases. In fact, the Argentines established a practice of locating their bases
in close proximity to British stations. See C. GRATTrAN, supra note 13, at 662-69. On February
2, 1952, the Argentine Navy actually fired on a British expedition attempting to land. This
dispute, however, was later resolved through diplomatic channels. Gould, supra note 10, at
23. On May 4, 1955, Great Britain made a unilateral application to the International Court
of Justice in an effort to achieve a judicial settlement of the territorial dispute. Since submis-
sion to the jurisdiction of the court is voluntary and because a British application had been
made, Chile and Argentina were put in the position of having to formally refuse to adjudicate.
Hayton, supra note 23, at 607-08.
42. Hayton, supra note 23, at 591.
43. U.N. Doc. A/3118, October 16, 1956. This proposal was later withdrawn by India
because of opposition, notably by Chile and Argentina, to any international scheme requiring
a relinquishment of sovereignty claims. See Hayton, supra note 32, at 760.
44. U.N. Doc. A/3852, July 15, 1958. Because of resistance, India again decided not to
press the issue. By the time the proposal was submitted, plans were being made to convene
an Antarctic Treaty conference among 12 interested states. See Hayton, supra note 32, at 760.
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began on July 1, 1957 and continued for the ensuing eighteen
months. The I.G.Y. was a cooperative, nongovernmental research
project carried on by various national members of the International
Council of Scientific Unions. 5 As part of the cooperative, some
forty-eight research bases were established by eleven states in differ-
ent areas of Antarctica without regard to sector claims." A gentle-
mens' agreement to the effect that all activities taking place during
the I.G.Y. were to be nonpolitical and could not serve as the basis
for territorial or other claims existed among all I.G.Y. participants.47
On May 3, 1958, the United States, prompted by Soviet an-
nouncements that it intended to continue operating its bases in the
Australian sector after the termination of the I.G.Y.,45 invited eleven
other states to participate in joint talks regarding the future of
Antarctica." The United States Proposal calling for an Antarctic
Treaty was designed to prolong the international cooperation initi-
ated by the I.G.Y.5 0 This conference5 ultimately did produce the
45. Sixty-six countries, far more than had any interest in Antarctica, participated in
these geophysical studies. Of particular interest to the geophysicists was the influence of the
huge southern ice mass on global weather and on atmospheric and oceanographic dynamics.
Although the primary thrust of research activity was directed toward Antarctica, I.G.Y.
stations existed worldwide. See generally C. GRATTAN, supra note 13, at 696-97. Gould, supra
note 10, at 35-37.
46. The states operating stations in Antarctica during the I.G.Y. were: Argentina (8),
Australia (2), Belgium (1), Chile (4), France (2), Great Britain (14), Japan (1), New Zealand
(1), Norway (1), the Soviet Union (6) and the United States (8). C. GRATTAN, supra note 13,
at 697. It is estimated that there were about five thousand persons on the continent at one
time during I.G.Y. research activities. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASic, LAW AND
PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 800 n.126 (1963) [hereinafter cited as LAW IN SPACE]. For a map
showing the location and distribution of I.G.Y. bases, see P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra
note 23, at 144-45.
47. See generally note 33 and accompanying text supra.
48. See Hayton, The Antarctic Settlement of 1959, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 353 (1960); cf.
Gould, supra note 10, at 48 (the concern of the United States over possibility of the Soviet
Union obtaining exclusive footholds in Antarctica after the end of the I.G.Y.).
49. United States Proposes Conference on Antarctica, 38 DEP'T STATE BULL. 910 (1958).
The states invited were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, the Soviet Union, the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom. Despite their
previous recalcitrance, both Chile and Argentina agreed to participate. See note 42 and
accompanying text supra. In light of the likelihood that the conference would be held anyway
and the reality that a "widely popular, concrete proposal" would probably result, participa-
tion was the only viable alternative for these two competing claimants. Hayton, supra note
32, at 78-79. Poland requested participation in the conference but remained uninvited. Never-
theless, it maintained an interest in Antarctica, and during 1958-59, a Polish expedition in
collaboration with the Soviet Union conducted activities out of a Russian base in Antarctica.
Hayton, supra note 48, at 354 n.22.
50. This initiative of the United States was almost certainly motivated by Cold War
considerations, and its primary goal was probably the continued demilitarization of Antarc-
tica. Because the United States had previously called for the internationalization of Antarc-
tica, see note 38 supra, and never made a formal sovereignty claim, and because in 1959
Antarctica was thought to have little resource potential, there is little reason to conclude that
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present Antarctic Treaty, which was signed in Washington on De-
cember 1, 1959,52 and entered into force on June 23, 1961.11
Relying on the international cooperation established during the
I.G.Y. as its foundation," the Antarctic Treaty called for the contin-
ued and exclusive use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes. 5 Military
activities were strictly prohibited. Additionally, the detonation of
nuclear explosives and the disposal of radioactive waste were forbid-
den.57
The provisions of the Treaty apply to the area south of latitude
60' S., including the ice shelves. No authority, however, is asserted
over what would be regarded as the high seas under international
law." In general terms, the area so defined is to be used for scientific
observations. The articles set out an agreement providing that sci-
entific information and personnel will be freely exchanged among
Treaty parties on prospective, as well as present, activities in Ant-
the United States' proposal was primarily the result of American proprietary ambition.
The invitation, delivered by the American ambassador to the invited countries, stated
in part:
The International Geophysical Year comes to a close at the end of 1958. The
need for coordinated scientific research in Antarctica, however, will continue for
many more years into the future. Accordingly, it would appear desirable for those
countries participating in the Antarctic program of the International Geophysical
Year to reach agreement among themselves on a program to assure the continua-
tion of the fruitful scientific cooperation referred to above. Such an arrangement
could have the additional advantage of preventing unnecessary and undesirable
political rivalries in that continent, the uneconomic expenditure of funds to de-
fend individual national interests, and the recurrent possibility of international
misunderstanding.
United States Proposes Conference on Antarctica, 38 DEP'T STATE BULL. 910, 911 (1958).
51. For the text of the welcoming address by Secretary of State Herter, see Conference
on Antarctic Opens at Washington, 41 DEP'T STATE BULL. 650 (1959).
52. See Twelve Nations Sign Treaty Guaranteeing Nonmilitarization of Antarctica and
Freedom of Scientific Investigation, 41 DEP'T STATE BULL. 911 (1959). Of the 12 states which
signed the Treaty, only 7 had existing sovereignty claims to Antarctica. These were Argen-
tina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom. The Union
of South Africa claimed an island below latitute 600 S. (the boundary limit of the Treaty
area); however, it had made no claim to a sector of the Antarctic continent. The nonclaimant
states were Belgium, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States.
53. [19611 12 U.S.T. at 794, 402 U.N.T.S. at 71.
54. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, Preamble (Treaty called for "the continuation and
development of such cooperation" in accord "with the interests of science and the progress
of all mankind").
55. Id. art. I(1) (forbids establishment of military bases, carrying out of military maneu-
vers and testing of weaponry).
56. The Treaty does not prohibit the presence of military personnel in Antarctica if they
are connected with scientific research or other peaceful purposes. Id. art. I(2).
57. Id. art. V(1).
58. Id. art. VI. The Southern Ocean below latitude 60' S. is an integral part of the
Antarctic Treaty area. Fifth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Nov. 29, 1968, 24 U.S.T.
1793, T.I.A.S. No. 7692 [hereinafter cited as Fifth Consultative Meeting].
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arctica.5' To ensure both this exchange and compliance with Treaty
provisions, "Consultative Parties"" may designate "observers" who
have complete access to all areas of Antarctica.! Advance notice
must be given to all Consultative Parties before any expedition is
undertaken.2
The Treaty allows for amendment and modification at any
time.63 Accession to the Treaty is open to any member of the United
Nations upon the unanimous agreement of the Consultative Parties
and to nonmembers by invitation." A prerequisite to becoming a
Consultative Party, and thus to having voting rights, is a substan-
tial commitment to scientific research activity in the area." Al-
though the language of the Treaty implies that an interested state
which has already acceded and hence become a contracting party6
would automatically have an option to become a Consultative Party
upon fulfilling the qualifying criteria, 7 actual events indicate other-
wise. Thus far, Poland has been the only applicant for consultative
membership which has been accepted. 8
Consultative meetings are to be held for the purpose of formu-
lating and recommending measures in furtherance of the principles
and objectives of the Treaty.6 Proposed measures, to become effec-
59. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. M(1).
60. Consultative Parties are those Treaty members which have the power to appoint
representatives to the consultative meetings. As such, these states are the only Treaty partici-
pants with voting status. See id. art. IX(1)-(2).
61. Id. art. VII (purpose of observers is to "promote the objectives and ensure the observ-
ance of the provisions of the present Treaty"); cf. Hayton, supra note 48, at 361 (Article VII
is "the strongest concrete stipulation" in the Treaty).
62. Id. art. VII(2).
63. Id. art. XHI(1) (modification or amendment enters into force upon notice of unani-
mous ratification).
64. Id. art. XIII(1)-(3). To date there are eight Treaty parties who were not among the
original signatories: Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the German Democratic Republic, the
Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 260 (1977), and since
Sept. 11, 1978, Bulgaria, 78 DEP'T STATE BuLL. No. 2020, at 56 (Nov. 1978).
65. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX(2) (examples of "substantial scientific re-
search activity" include "the establishment of a scientific station or the dispatch of a scien-,
tific expedition").
66. "Contracting Parties" include both the original signatories and those states which
have acceded to the Treaty. For a list of original parties, see note 52 supra. Acceding states
are listed at note 64 supra.
67. The only criterion specified in the Treaty is that an acceding party must
"demonstrate its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity
there." Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX(2).
68. Telecommunication with Norman Wulf, Legal Adviser to National Science Founda-
tion (Oct. 12, 1977) (on file at University of Miami Law Review).
69. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX(l) (consultative meetings shall also serve as
a forum for the exchange of ideas and discussion of matters of common interest pertaining to
Antarctica).
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tive, must be approved by all Consultative Parties. 0 In the event
that any proposed modification or amendment fails to enter into
force within two years of its communication to all contracting par-
ties, any party to the Treaty may serve notice of its intention to
withdraw. Such a withdrawal then becomes effective two years after
receipt of such notice.7 Should a dispute between contracting par-
ties arise, the Treaty suggests procedures for settlement which in-
clude negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration." Disput-
ing parties may choose any procedure which is a pacific means of
settlement, however, and are not limited by the specifically enumer-
ated methods.73
While nonsignatory states are not bound by the prohibitions of
the Treaty, contracting parties are under an obligation to see that
it is observed by all. In what might be termed the "policeman's
clause" of the Treaty, contracting parties have agreed, within the
bounds of the Charter of the United Nations, to exert appropriate
efforts in order to ensure that "no one engages in any activity in
Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes of the present
Treaty."'"
Significantly, with respect to questions of sovereignty, the
Treaty "freezes" prior and potential claims. Nothing contained in
the Treaty will be interpreted as affecting previously asserted enti-
tlements. 5 Moreover, acts or activities transpiring while the Treaty
is in force neither create nor enlarge any previously existing claim
of territorial sovereignty."
III. SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS AND THE ANTARCTIC RESOURCE PROBLEM
A. Status of Sovereignty Claims to Antarctica
The status and weight accorded to claims of sovereignty in
Antarctica is central to the Antarctic resource problem. Key issues
which arise in determining this status are: (1) whether traditional
methods of "land" discovery and acquisition are relevant to the
various forms of semipermanent ice in Antarctica; (2) whether the
70. Id. art. XII (1)(a); see note 63 and accompanying text supra.
71. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. XII(1)(b). See generally notes 181-83 and accom-
panying text infra.
72. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. XI(1).
73. Id. art. XI(2) (failure to resolve a disagreement after reference to the International
Court of Justice does not absolve parties of their responsibility to seek a peaceful accord).
74. Id. art. X.
75. Id. art. IV(l) (nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as a "renunciation" or
"diminution" of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty).
76. Id. art. IV(2) (no new claims or enlargement of existing claims while the Treaty is in
force).
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more modern "sector theory" method of staking sovereignty claims
relaxes the traditionally accepted requirements attended upon land
acquisition; and (3) whether any of the claims made thus far by
participants in the exploration and exploitation of Antarctica have
satisfied the older criteria to the point that they, because of either
their manner or scope, should be accorded a superior weight when
compared with the interests of other states.
Unfortunately, the Antarctic Treaty does not explicitly address
these issues.77 Although the Treaty effectively demilitarizes the re-
gion7" and guarantees access to the area for scientific research pur-
poses, it does not attempt to govern resource activities. This failure
stems in part from a desire to avoid a confrontation among the
claimant states7 and in part from ignorance of the resource poten-
tial of the region.
These deficiencies, however, have gradually become crucial and
stand as a source of potential diplomatic and military conflict.
While sector claims were once made casually and, for the most part,
without serious disagreement among the participating states,80 they
have now acquired a perceived strategic' and economic signifi-
cance, which makes almost all claims subject to heated dispute. The
refusal of the Soviet Union in 1958 to relinquish the research sta-
tions it acquired during the I.G.Y. is characteristic of this new real-
ity. In such an atmosphere, the manner in which a state stakes a
claim becomes part of the criteria by which the validity of the claim
is judged by the international community.
B. The Susceptibility of Antarctic Ice to Sovereignty Claims
In many respects, Antarctica is a geological anomaly. As a con-
sequence of its peculiar physical nature, it is often difficult to assign
juridical classification to the various geomorphologic units of Ant-
arctica. This is particularly true in the case of the three Antarctic
ice forms-continental sheet ice, 2 pack icem and shelf ice.8 ' The crux
77. See generally Antarctic Resources-Report from the Meeting of Experts at Fridtgof
Nansen Foundation at Polhegda [hereinafter cited as Nansen Foundation Report with page
citations to Antarctic Policy Hearing, infra], reprinted in United States Antarctic Policy:
Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on Oceans and Int'l Environment of the Comm. on
Foreign Rel., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76-78 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Antarctic Policy
Hearing].
78. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. I.
79. Similar to the one which arose as a result of the overlapping claims of Chile, Argen-
tina and the United Kingdom.
80. Excluding, of course, the dispute referred to in note 79 supra.
81. See LAW IN SPACE, supra note 46, at 799 (discussion of military considerations as they
relate to Antarctica).
82. Continental sheet ice is formed on land where fresh water and compacting snow
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of the problem is whether to include the respective ice forms in a
legal regime associated with land or with water. This determination
is significant because of the different rules of international law appl-
icable to the territorial acquisition of land and water. Moreover,
classification is also necessary because there is no independent, gen-
erally acknowledged body of international law applicable to ice.
Land"5 is, of course, subject to sovereignty claims. Water which
is part of the high seas, however, is not susceptible to such claims.
The 1958 Convention on the High Seas concluded: "The High Seas
being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject
any part of them to its sovereignty."8 1 While it is certainly true that,
in a physical sense, ice is different from water, that fact does not
preclude the classification of some forms of ice as "water," or per-
haps as "high seas,"87 for juridical purposes.
Logically, since sheet ice forms on the land and overlays a geo-
morphologic land basement, it is land-based and should therefore
be governed by a juridical regime associated with land. In support
freeze to form layers of ice, adding pressure to that beneath. This form of ice, which is
generally considered land ice, encompasses 95% of the Antarctic continent. Its 5.5 million
square miles spread over an area the approximate size of the United States and Mexico
combined. I. CAMERON, supra note 5, at 12.
83. Often described as sea ice, pack ice is formed by the freezing of sea water along the
coast. The Antarctic continent is girdled by a ring of pack ice that fluctuates in size according
to the season. In summer, the area of the pack ice may be no greater than the British Isles,
while in winter its area may be larger than the United States and Canada combined. Pack
ice may extend outward from the coast to a distance of one thousand miles. Id. at 17.
84. Shelf ice is formed on the surface of the ocean, generally in bays and sheltered areas.
Deposits of this type can, and often do, build up a shelf which will remain attached to land
for extended periods of time. Shelf ice is especially subject to calving and large portions often
break away to form icebergs. These icebergs may be larger than the state of Massachusetts
and can drift for as long as 10 years. H. KING, supra note 9, at 7.
85. "Land" is defined as: "The solid substance composing the material part of the
earth, considered in its entirety; especially the exposed surface of the earth as opposed to the
oceans and seas." FUNK & WAGNALL'S NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1383 (1949). Because "ice" is defined as "congealed or frozen water," id., it can be inferred
from the above definitions that "ice" is never "land" because "oceans and seas" are gener-
ally composed of "water." The fact that ice may never be considered "land" in the geological
sense does not prohibit the classification of some forms of ice as "land" for juridical purposes.
86. Convention on the High Seas, open for signature Apr. 29, 1958, art. 2,13 U.S.T. 2313,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962).
87. "The term 'high seas' means all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial
sea or in the internal waters of a State." Id. art. 1. It is possible that the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) may result in the diminution of waters
heretofore considered "high seas." Economic "zones of various extents have already been
declared by several states; some extend for two hundred miles from the coastal baseline.
There appears to be a dispute concerning whether or not these "zones" will have "high sea"
status. See also Revised Single Negotiating Text of the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, art. 75, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev. 1 (May 6, 1976) (does not
include exclusive economic zones in definition of high seas).
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of this position, it is significant that marine navigation in the tradi-
tional sense is impossible through any medium composed of conti-
nental sheet ice. The inability of marine transit to negotiate this ice
form further indicates that the freedom of navigation consideration
applicable to the classification of the "high seas" is not implicated
in the case of continental sheet ice and, as such, does not present a
restraint on the application of sovereignty claims.88
While compelling arguments can be advanced supporting the
proposition that the juridical nature of continental sheet ice is
identical to that of land, the juridical nature of pack and shelf ice
is "largely undetermined for purposes of territorial acquisition. Legal
publicists who have addressed the pack and shelf ice classification
issue usually examine the reasons underlying the legal concept that
land is subject to sovereignty claims while the high seas are not."
One criteria which has been advanced is the degree to which various
ice formations permit marine navigation. 0 Experience in the Arctic
teaches that pack ice is definitely susceptible to navigation."' Ant-
arctic pack ice is structurally similar to Arctic pack ice" and is
passable via icebreaker and submarine. Using this as the determina-
tive standard, it appears that Antarctic pack ice should be subject
to the same legal regime applicable to the high seas and thus not
subject to claims of sovereignty."3
The application of the "susceptibility of navigation" criterion
to Antarctic shelf ice is a more difficult enterprise. Where shelf ice
has formed in an Antarctic bay and is vertically homogeneous, it is
not susceptible to marine navigation of the traditional surface or
88. Cf. D. PHARAND, THE LAW OF THE SEA OF THE ARcrc 181-82 (1973) (frozen water and
land are similar in that both form an effective barrier to navigation); Bernhardt, Sovereignty
in Antarctica, 5 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 297, 302 (1975) (sheet ice generally considered land ice).
The "susceptibility of navigation" criterion is discussed in notes 90-93 and accompanying text
infra.
89. For a discussion and comparison of the arguments advanced by leading theoreticians
regarding the sovereignty status of Antarctic ice formations, see Bernhardt, supra note 88, at
302-10.
90. See, e.g., id. at 309.
91. In 1977, a nuclear powered Soviet icebreaker reached the North Pole. Miami Herald,
Aug. 18, 1977, § A, at 4, col. 1. The U.S.S. Skate and the U.S.S. Seadragon have transited
routes through the Northwest Passage and the Seadragon has reached the North Pole via
submerged navigation. D. PHARAND, supra note 88, at 162. Interestingly, feasibility and cost
studies are currently in progress with a view toward using giant submarine tankers for the
transportation of oil through the Arctic Ocean to Western Europe. Id. at 163.
92. Compare I. CAMERON, supra note 5, at 15-17 (description of Antarctic pack ice) with
D. PHARAND, supra note 88, at 153 (description of Arctic pack ice). See generally Mouton, The
International Regime of the Polar Regions, 107 RECUEIL DES CouRs 169, 197 (1962).
93. See, e.g., J. KISH, supra note 17, at 35-36 (ice formations not attached to the coast
are subject to the general regime of the high seas).
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even subsurface modes." On this basis, it seems that Antarctic shelf
ice would generally be subject to sovereignty claims.
There is, however, an Antarctic geological phenomenon involv-
ing shelf ice that presents serious problems for the application of the
"susceptibility of navigation" criterion. In several instances, nota-
bly the gigantic Ross Ice Shelf, portions of the thick ice shelf are
floating on a subjacent water column. 5 Submarine transit may, in
rare cases, be possible beneath these so-called "ice tongues.""
Whether this is sufficient to render the ice tongues beyond the reach
of sovereignty claims is uncertain. 7 In most instances, however,
because the thickness of the floating shelf ice98 prevents any naviga-
tion, it appears that the ice tongues would be subject to sovereignty
claims.
The juridical nature of the underlying water is a far more diffi-
cult issue to resolve. Several possible solutions have been advanced
in an effort to determine the status of this subjacent hydrosphere. 9
Those suggested include treating it as a territorial sea,'00 as inland
waters'0' or as the high seas.' Naturally, the degree to which a
hypothetical sovereign could prohibit submerged transit would de-
pend on the status afforded to the water columns.
Permanency is a second basis commonly used by legal commen-
tators to determine whether ice is to be assimilated to a land or to
a high sea legal regime.' 3 The "permanence principle" posits that
all ice formations that are immobile should be considered within the
94. See generally N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1976, at 1, col. 3 (the Ross Ice Shelf is generally
700 feet thick and over 1,375 feet thick in some areas).
95. See Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 310. See generally N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1976, at 1,
col. 7 (depth of water beneath Ross Ice Shelf drill site estimated at 780 feet).
96. See Mouton, supra note 92, at 196.
97. Bernhardt suggests three reasons why the possibility of subsurface transit is not
sufficiently compelling to assimilate shelf ice into a high seas regime: (1) the problem is de
minimis from a practical perspective because there are only a few areas of Antarctica which
would permit submarine navigation; (2) in most places where the ice shelves would admit
submarine navigation, the thickness of the ice would be so great that there would be little
threat to the territorial sovereign above; and (3) the problem probably would never arise since
a territorial sovereign would most likely be entitled to a territorial sea in which it could, in
the exercise of its discretion, prohibit all subsurface navigation. Bernhardt, supra note 88, at
310.
98. In some cases, the floating shelf ice is over one thousand feet thick. See note 94 supra.
99. See Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 310.
100. The territorial sovereignty of the sector state extends beyond its land territory and
its internal waters to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast. J. KISH, supra note 17, at 27.
101. "Inland waters" include ports and waters within the indentations of the coastline.
With respect to these waters, coastal sovereigns claim an authority to permit or deny access
to private or governmental vessels. M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDFR OF THE
OCEANS 89, 93 (1962).
102. For a definition of the "high seas," see note 87 supra.
103. See generally Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 303-10.
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land regime, while those ice formations that are mobile should be
included in the high seas regime."4
Pack ice lacks any real aspect of permanency.' Not only is it
unattached to land, but also it has a tendency to break up at sea-
sonal intervals.' It cannot be classified as immobile ice because it
lacks coastal attachment. As a result, Antarctic pack ice appears
unsusceptible to sovereignty claims.
The changing physical nature of shelf ice makes it difficult to
generalize about its legal status. For the most part, it is integrally
connected to land. 07 Shelf ice, however, is subject to calving, the
breaking off of large pieces which form floating icebergs.0 " In this
respect, shelf ice is mobile and impermanent. Nevertheless, it is
possible that such a process should not affect the legal status of the
major ice shelves. An analogy may be drawn to the geological pro-
cesses of accretion, erosion and avulsion, none of which diminishes
the susceptibility of land to claims of sovereignty. 10
Although the Ross Ice Shelf, an immense Antarctic ice struc-
ture which effectively blocks surface navigation, is subject to some
calving, it should be considered indistinguishable from land with
regard to sovereignty claims."0 It actually rests upon land in some
places, and, for all practical purposes, it does not differ at all from
the ice-covered mainland."' The real problems arise with ice shelves
that are not as large and stable as the Ross Ice Shelf. Particularly
in Antarctica, where there is an active inland ice sheet, portions of
shelves or even the entire shelf may disintegrate over a fairly short
period of time."2 Therefore, it has been suggested that it would be
104. See Lakhtine, Rights Over the Arctic, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 703, 712 (1930).
105. Surrounding Antarctica like a belt and often reaching widths of up to one thousand
miles are enormous ice fields comprised of pack ice, frequently called the "pack." Mouton,
supra note 92, at 197.
106. Pack ice, which is formed by the freezing of surface layers, is generally solid in the
winter and impenetrable for 10 out of 12 months. Ranging from heights of 1 inch to 12 feet,
Antarctic pack ice is never still. It drifts under the constant influence of currents and winds.
I. CAMERON, supra note 5, at 17. Expanding and contracting according to season, its annual
variation in area is about six times as great as that for Arctic pack ice. ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITrANIcA, 1 MACROPAEDIA 956 (1974).
107. Ice shelves near the true coast line actually rest on the seabed; in deeper water,
however, they float.
108. The calving which occurs off the coastline of Antarctica has produced icebergs of
enormous size. A British ship in 1951 reported sighting an iceberg 90 miles long and 25 miles
wide. W. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 337. In November of 1956, an American icebreaker
observed an iceberg north of the Ross Ice Shelf which measured about 200 miles in length
and 40 miles in width. Mouton, supra note 92, at 196.
109. See Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 305.
110. See G. SMEDAL, ACQUISmON OVER POLAR REGIONS 30-31 (1931).
111". See Mouton, supra note 92, at 192-93.
112. For a discussion of the calving phenomenon, see notes 107-09 and accompanying
text supra.
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desirable to develop criteria which could readily be used to deter-
mine the relative stability of an ice shelf."'
In summary, the continental sheet ice covering the mainland
of Antarctica would most likely be subject to claims of sovereignty
under existing theories of international law even though the validity
of existing claims to these areas appears to be in doubt."' It is very
doubtful that floating pack ice is susceptible to claims of sover-
eignty."' Ice shelves present the most difficult questions and may
have to be considered on an individual basis. In any event, the
unique physical nature of Antarctica will require the development
of sui generis legal principles as rapidly as possible.
C. An Appraisal of the Sector Theory Under International Law
At present, seven states have laid claims to Antarctic territo-
ries '"6 which encompass all types of ice formations. The "sector
theory" 'has served as the method for defining claims of territorial
acquisition."' Before any state can hope to perfect a sovereign title
to an Antarctic territory, however, it must first obtain sufficient
recognition of its claim by other members of the international com-
munity."'
Historically, states have most often acquired the necessary rec-
ognition of their territorial claims through traditional modes such
as accretion, annexation, cession, discovery and occupation, plebi-
scite, and prescription.19 The most applicable of these conventional
modes due to the terra nullis status of Antarctica is discovery and
occupation. 20 The exceedingly severe environment of Antarctica,
113. See generally D. PHARAND, supra note 88, at 181-88 (seeking to determine the legal
status of ice shelves in terms of a permanency criteria).
114. See generally notes 116-55 and accompanying text infra (discussion of sector
theory).
115. See, e.g., Hayton, supra note 48, at 472 (the author suggests that "pack ice...
and floating ice islands separated from mainland attachment are not assimilated to the status
of territory, no matter what their dimensions.").
116. For a listing of these claims, see notes 17-25 and accompanying text supra.
117. Although often compared directly with traditional modes of territorial acquisition,
the sector theory, on a conceptual level, is something quite different. It does not indepen-
dently support sovereignty claims but instead serves as a method of delineating claims which
can look to some other mode or theory as their basis. Without the underpinning doctrines of
contiguity, discovery, occupation or some other accepted principle of international law, the
sector theory would be of little use.
118. For a work which considers the importance of international recognition of territorial
claims, see Schwarzenberger, Title to Territory: Response to a Challenge, 51 AM. J. INT'L L.
308 (1951).
119. The enumerated modes represent the six principal theories advanced by Soviet
jurists through which a state can acquire title to a territory. Toma, supra note 35, at 611.
120. See Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 317 (primary mode of acquiring sovereignty in
Antarctica is occupation coupled with discovery).
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however, makes effective occupation an impractical goal. 2' It is
perhaps for this reason that claimant states in Antarctica have
made claims to sectors instead of to the less symmetrical territorial
configurations that would generally be associated with actual occu-
pation, settlement and development.
The sector theory was first recognized in modem usage in 1907,
when Canada employed it to justify its claim to lands and islands
lying between its northern border and the North Pole.'22 The sector
theory as applied by Canada rested on the notion that the area
claimed adjoined existing Canadian borders. Such is not the case
in Antarctica.' 3 Still, the impossibility of effective occupation in the
inhospitable regions of Antarctica' may warrant the relaxation of
traditional criteria associated with territorial acquisition and per-
mit the use of the sector theory. Another justification offered is the
claimant's proximity to the territory and its presumed ability to
assert jurisdiction and control. Under this premise, undiscovered
lands within the sector are presumed to belong to the claimant and,
consequently, the criterion of discovery and effective occupation, in
its fullest sense, is discarded." 5
121. One visitor to Antarctica described the continent as follows:
Antarctica is by far the coldest place on earth; weather stations have reported
temperatures of -880 C., more than 200 below those recorded anywhere else. In
this sort of cold if you try to burn a candle the flame becomes obscured by a cylin-
drical hood of wax, if you drop a steel bar it is likely to shatter like glass, tin
disintegrates into loose granules, mercury freezes into a solid metal, and if you
haul up a fish through a hole in the ice within five seconds it is frozen so solid
that it has to be cut with a saw.
I. CAMERON, supra note 5, at 14.
122. Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 334. On February 20, 1907, a Canadian Senator named
N.P. Poirier proposed that Canada issue a declaration stating that it had taken possession of
the lands and islands lying between its northern coast and the North Pole. There is, however,
some question whether the proposal by Senator Poirier was the initial impetus behind the
sector theory. A map published by the Canadian Department of the Interior in 1904 depicted
the western boundary of Canada as being longitude 141* W. extending north to the Pole, and
the eastern boundary as being longitude 600 W. also extending to the Pole. D. PHARAND, supra
note 88, at 134.
123. Antarctica is too far from any other landmass to justify any claim of contiguous
boundaries. Polar sectors, however, have been described as being areas delimited by a
definite coordinate that encompasses all islands and lands within it. Lateral boundaries are
determined by longitude lines. Either the area of the sector or a specified parallel latitude
defines the "coastline" of the sector. Under the sector theory, all of the area within these
bounds is then considered to be the territory of the claimant state. Bernhardt, supra note 88,
at 332.
124. Antarctica contains the coldest areas on earth. At the Pole, the average temperature
is -50' C. Winds are notorious for their strength. The Australian explorer Mawson once re-
corded an average speed of 107 mph over a consecutive eight hour period. I. CAMERON, supra
note 5, at 14. There is precious little soil on the continent, and only lichen can be found
growing within three hundred miles of the Pole. H. KING, supra note 9, at 9.
125. Another justification advanced for asserting claims to more territory than has been
effectively occupied is the "hinterland" principle. Under this doctrine, states with coastal
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The sector theory, which embodies a means of sovereignty ac-
quisition over yet undiscovered areas, has not gone unchallenged by
the commentators' and, in fact, has never been incorporated into
customary international law.' The practices of the states adjacent
to the Arctic regarding their sector claims have varied widely, and
no country has interpreted the sector theory in its broadest applica-
tion. Although maps and unofficial statements would indicate that
Canada' 8 and the Soviet Union' have claimed sectors of the Arctic,
official statements" and actions indicate that they are unsure of the
validity and extent of their claims.'' The other Arctic contiguous
states-Denmark, Norway and the United States-neither claim
nor recognize sectors in the Arctic. 3 1
Since there appears to be no consensus among the adjacent
Arctic states regarding the application of the sector theory to Arctic
territories, it would be overly ambitious to suggest that the sector
theory is an accepted doctrine in international law. Furthermore,
since the sector theory, as developed in the Arctic, is predicated on
the state's proximity to the lands claimed, it is even less applicable
in the Antarctic than in the Arctic. No country has physical bound-
aries which extend below the southern polar circle, nor is there a
physical connection between any of the claimant states and the
sectors which they claim. Reliance on proximity to Antarctica by
Chile and Argentina, which are about six hundred miles away, is
settlements have claimed vast portions of the interiors of North and South America, Africa
and Australia. While never widely accepted as a principle of international law, these claims
were often perfected by agreements between the interested states. See generally Bernhardt,
supra note 88, at 343-45.
126. See, e.g., G. SMEDAL, supra note 110, at 58.
[The] sector principle is not a legal principle having a title in the law of nations.
This is partly admitted by those who uphold it. Nor should the principle be
embodied in international law, for one reason because it aims at a monopoly
which will doubtless delay, and partly prevent, exploration and exploitation of the
polar regions.
Id.
127. For an analysis of customary international law as it applies to the sector theory, see
C. FENWICK, INTEMATIONAL LAW 89-98 (4th ed. 1965).
128. For a discussion of the sector theory and its relation to Canada's involvement in
the Arctic, see D. PHARAND, supra note 88, at 134-44.
129. See id. at 123-27 (considering application of the sector theory to the Soviet Arctic).
See also Lakhtine, supra note 104, at 703-17 (undiscovered territory within the Arctic Circle
should be under sovereignty of the adjacent polar state with no consideration being afforded
the nationality of any explorer).
130. See D. PRAAND, supra note 88, at 141 (Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau does not
subscribe to the sector theory).
131. For example, the Soviet Union did not object to the presence of United States
icebreakers in the Soviet sector until they penetrated what the Soviet Union considered to
be its territorial waters. Id. at 171.
132. Id. at 169-70, 175-76.
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unpersuasive. Similar assertions would seem ludicrous if advanced
by states in the Northern Hemisphere. Additionally, many of the
socioeconomic consequences of contiguity which are relevant to the
Arctic simply do not exist to the same degree in Antarctica. The
area within the Arctic Circle is close to large population concentra-
tions in Europe and North America, which makes the Arctic signifi-
cant from both strategic and economic perspectives.' In contrast,
Antarctica is an unpopulated continent, unparalled in its remote-
ness and thus less susceptible to claims of sovereign entitlement
based on this aspect of the sector theory.' 34
The sector theory does not enjoy general recognition in the in-
ternational community, particularly with regard to Antarctica.'3
Although many of the claimant states respect each other's claim's,1
the United States and the Soviet Union-active and powerful par-
ticipants in Antarctic activities-have neither asserted sovereignty
in Antarctica nor recognized the claims of these other countries.137
Moreover, it appears that no states other than the sector claimant
states have admitted the validity of the sector theory as applied to
the southern polar region.
Since the geographic locations of the countries declaring sover-
eignty in Antarctica make the principles of contiguity and proxim-
ity of limited value in the southern polar region, 3 a second basis
for justifying sector claims has evolved.' 3 Acts of historical discov-
ery and occupation have emerged as the underlying support in sev-
eral instances. Where these claims are based upon present or histori-
cal involvement, the physical characteristics of the claimant states
are irrelevant. Instead, sovereignty depends on the degree to which
the claim fits within the legal criteria traditionally associated with
133. See Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 336.
134. See id. (Soviet publicist suggests that because of the lack of proximity, it would be
a mistake to extend the sector theory to Antarctica).
135. Mouton, supra note 92, at 245. For a collection of opinions advanced by leading
publicists regarding the relative validity of sector theory application to Antarctica, see Bern-
hardt, supra note 88, at 336.
136. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 23, at 158 (Britain, France, New Zealand,
Australia, Norway and South Africa recognize each other's claims).
137. For a more detailed discussion of the positions of the United States and Soviet
Union, see notes 32-37 and accompanying text supra.
138. Of the states asserting sector claims, only Argentina, Australia, Chile and New
Zealand are in the Southern Hemisphere and are directly across an ocean from Antarctica.
Even ignoring the vast expanse of water in between, some of these interests are difficult to
support. Australia, for example, asserts claims to territories which, for the most part, lie south
of the Indian Ocean and not directly south of Australia. For a map of Antarctic sector claims,
see P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 23, at 144-45.
139. France, Great Britain and Norway have each laid claim to sectors in Antarctica,
yet these states are continents away from the territories over which they claim to be sover-
eigns.
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discovery and occupation, accepted modes of territorial acquisition.
Discovery alone is not generally considered a valid basis for a
perfected title. At a minimum, discovery must be followed by or
combined with symbolic acts designed to announce a claim of sover-
eignty.1'" Nevertheless, history is replete with examples of states
occupying and claiming territories which they knew had been dis-
covered and symbolically annexed by another state.'4 ' As a result,
it is unlikely that discovery, even when coupled with symbolic acts,
will provide anything more than an inchoate title. 4'
Occupation has traditionally been considered to be a prerequis-
ite to perfection of a sovereign title acquired through discovery,
and today it is the primary mode of territorial acquisition."' The
accepted standard is one of "effective occupation."'115 The determi-
nation of what acts are required to achieve this level, especially in
the polar regions, is the subject of much controversy." 6
According to a traditional view, there are two distinct acts
which claimant states must complete prior to obtaining a perfected
title based on occupation of terra nullius lands."7 The first act is the
"taking of possession," which can be accomplished only by "real"
140. In their classic work Law and Public Order in Space, McDougal, Lasswell and
Vlasic asserted:
Discovery has sometimes been regarded as the mere sighting or visual apprehen-
sion of land masses. When discovery is so conceived, claims have seldom been
made that it alone can effect an exclusive appropriation. Claims have been been
made, however, that such discovery entitles a claimant to a reasonable time in
which to establish exclusive use by some other modality. Most often, the discov-
ery upon which claims to exclusive appropriation have been based has been ac-
companied by other acts, such as by the landing of men followed by exploration
of the interior, and especially by certain symbolic acts designed to announce an
intention to appropriate. These symbolic acts may range from simple ceremonies,
such as the planting of a flag or standard with an accompanying proclamation,
to elaborate rituals.
LAw IN SPACE, supra note 46, at 830 (footnotes omitted).
141. For example, England, France and the Netherlands, despite Spanish and Portu-
guese protests, consistently occupied areas symbolically annexed by the Spaniards and the
Portuguese. Similarly, the United States later took effective occupation of areas symbolically
annexed by England, France and Spain. Moreover, in some instances where no actual occupa-
tion had taken place, disputes were sometimes resolved by the relative significance of the
exploration and "symbolic act" activities. Such was the case regarding the disagreement
between the United States and England over the Oregon area in 1845. Id. at 835-40.
142. See Mouton, supra note 92, at 247.
143. See Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 318-20 (a state should have the right to appropriate
territory to the exclusion of others only if it uses the area claimed).
144. Id. at 319.
145. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAw oF NATIONS 163-65 (6th ed. 1963).
146. See Mouton, supra note 92, at 246-50 (former tendency among publicists suggesting
more relaxed standards than those associated with more temperate zones is changing in
direction of a rigid approach).
147. See Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 320.
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occupation. The second act, the "administration" of the territory,
is more difficult to define; perhaps it is even beyond narrow defini-
tion.' "Administration" does, however, comprehend that some
degree of "exercise of governmental functions" be established
within a "reasonable time."'' 9 Under this view, if the occupying
authority does not commence "governmental functions" within a
"reasonable time," another state could displace its prior claim.'
This two step process for determining effective occupation is no
longer afforded general acceptance by the international com-
munity.' Some commentators suggest that an inchoate title which
is derived through discovery, alone or combined with some
"symbolic act," has a grace period of from one to twenty-five years
before becoming susceptible to displacement.' 52 The Soviets, onthe
other hand, reject the two step theory of effective occupation alto-
gether and claim that discovery alone creates a permanent and
perfected title that can never be displaced by a succeeding state. 53
Another leading theorist suggests that occupation can be accom-
plished externally, through relations with other states. According to
this view, occupation is "the appropriation of sovereignty not of
soil." 54
148. I. CRuz, INTERNATIONAL LAW 84 (1971). If the claimant state does not begin to
exercise its sovereign rights, the inchoate title will lapse and the territory will become terra
nullius again.
149. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 145, at 166 (upon discovery, a temporary right is raised
in favor of the discoverer to exclude other states until it has had a reasonable time within
which to make an effective occupation).
150. During this "reasonable" period of time, the discoverer is said to have "a sort of
option to occupy" which is entitled to recognition by other states while it lasts. Id. For a
discussion of the "possession" and "administration" stages which lead up to effective occupa-
tion, see Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 319-20.
151. See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J. 22, ser. A/B, No. 53 (settle-
ment is not a necessary element of effective occupation); Clipperton Island Arbitral Award
(France v. Mexico), Jan. 28, 1931, reprinted in 26 Am. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932); Island of Palmas
Arbitral Award (United States v. Netherlands), Apr. 4, 1928, reprinted in 22 AM. J. INT'L L.
867 (1928). For a collection of arguments attempting to define "effective occupation," see
Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 320-32.
152. See, e.g., Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 322.
153. Professor Toma has translated an article appearing in the Komsomolskaya Pravda
which stated that:
Our country is the lawful heir to the outstanding Russian geographical discoveries
made in the South Polar Seas at the beginning of the 19th century. Historically
the right of priority in the discovery and exploration of a number of Antarctic
lands remains eternally with Russia and, by succession, with the U.S.S.R.
Toma, supra note 35, at 616.
154. See M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1265 (1963). This view certainly
offers more support to the position of territorial claimants in Antarctica than does the posses-
sion and administration approach. The latter presupposes a physical capability of appropria-
tion. In the absence of this precondition, a territory cannot be subject to effective control.
Since the physical conditions of Antarctica make it virtually incapable of appropriation,
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The divergent positions which these different theories assert
indicates that there is no generally accepted principle of interna-
tional law prescribing the minimum standard of effective occupa-
tion which Antarctic claimants must meet in order to acquire a
perfected title recognized by the international community. Thus, it
is submitted that the most viable method by which the respective
Antarctic claimants might obtain a recognized title to territorial
claims is through a decision by the International Court of Justice
or by some independent action of their own initiative which accom-
modates the rest of the international community. As there has been
no International Court of Justice decision on the status of Antarctic
claims, and since the current Antarctic claims are not internation-
ally recognized,15 there are no clearly perfected titles to Antarctica
that could provide a legal order governing the development of poten-
tial Antarctic resources.
D. An Appraisal of the Inchoate Status of Antarctic Sovereignty
Claims
Although no generally recognized sovereignty claims currently
exist in Antarctica, the respective claims do have relative degrees
of inchoate status.'" In order to create a perspective within which
to place the relative status of these inchoate sovereignty claims, it
is important to attempt to understand the nature and degree of
effective occupation associated with the decisions in the cases of the
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland'57 and Island of Palmas. I's
In Eastern Greenland, the Permanent Court of International
Justice decided in favor of Denmark despite Norway's contention
that Denmark failed to occupy the area in dispute. The court noted
the severe physical character of eastern Greenland'" in arriving at
its determination that intermittent and inextensive acts of sover-
under this view it would seem that the southern polar region could never be subject to
territorial soverignty. See generally id. at 1263-64.
155. Antarctic sector claims do, however, have limited recognition. Except for the dis-
pute concerning the overlapping claims of Argentina, Chile, and Great Britain, sector claim-
ants recognize each others' respective claims. See note 136 supra.
156. See, e.g., J. BMERLY, supra note 145, at 166.
157. [1933] P.C.I.J. 22, ser. A/B, No. 53.
158. (United States v. Netherlands), Apr. 4, 1928, reprinted in 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867
(1928).
159. The climate and character of Greenland are those of an Arctic country.
The "Inland Ice" is difficult to traverse, and parts of the coast-particularly of
the East coast-are for months together difficult of access owing to the influence
of the Polar current and the stormy winds on the icebergs and the floe ice and
owing to the frequent spells of bad weather.
[19331 P.C.I.J. at 27.
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eignty were sufficient to establish occupational sovereignty.'"" State-
ments made by the King of Denmark referring to Eskimos brought
back from Greenland as "our subjects,""' and the addition of a
Greenland emblem to the King's coat of arms "2 were early acts of
sovereignty. During the eighteenth century, Danish whalers regu-
larly visited the east coast of Greenland while the government of
Denmark promulgated regulations and granted concessions applica-
ble to eastern Greenland. Danish expeditions explored the entire
coastal region of Greenland during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, "3 and by the early twentieth century, Denmark had es-
tablished several trading companies on the east coast.'6 In consider-
ing Danish involvement in eastern Greenland, the court did not
find, nor did Denmark claim, any particular act of occupation.
Rather, the court held that Denmark established sovereignty over
all of Greenland, including the sparsely settled east coast, based
upon "the peaceful and continuous display of State authority over
the island." 5
The phrase "continuous and peaceful display of State author-
ity" was first used in the Permanent Court of Arbitration decision
concerning the unpopulated Island of Palmas.'6 In that case, the
United States, as successor to the rights of Spain by treaty, based
its title on discovery. The Netherlands countered this assertion with
160. Although Denmark had a long record of activities in the western and southern
coastal areas of Greenland where the majority of Greenlanders lived, activities in the eastern
area were much less intensive. Id. at 27-28.
161. The Eskimos were brought to Denmark by the Lindenow expedition in 1605. In
1636, the King gave a monopoly for navigation and trading in Greenland to Danish citizens.
Id. at 28.
162. In 1666, Frederick I added a bear, representing Greenland, to the arms of the
Danish Monarchy. Id.
163. The expeditions, including those led by Graah, Holm, Ryder, Amdrup, Peary, and
Lauge Koch, took place between the years 1828 and 1931. Id. at 31.
164. In 1919, the Eastern Greenland Company was founded. It built a number of houses
and hunting cabins in order that its hunters might winter there; however, by 1924 its resources
were exhausted and operations ceased. This hunting camp was opened again in 1929 by the
Nanok Company which carried on the principle occupations of its predecessor and equipped
its station with a wireless. Id. at 34.
165. Id. at 45. The court went on to state:
It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases as to territorial
sovereignty without observing that in many cases the tribunal has been satisfied
with very little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights, provided that
the other State could not make out a superior claim. This is particularly true in
the case of claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or unsettled
countries.
Id. at 46.
166. The Island of Palmas (United States v. Netherlands), Apr. 4, 1928, reprinted in
22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867, 911 (1928). The Island of Palmas lies halfway between the Philippines
and the Dutch East Indies. The United States, as a successor of Spain, based its asserted
entitlement mainly on the ground of its discovery of the island in the sixteenth century.
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a claim based on the commencement of occupation and the display
of authority. The primary basis of the Dutch claim was the existence
of historic trade agreements with the chiefs of neighboring islands.
The arbitrator decided that the Netherlands had an interest supe-
rior to that of the United States based upon "the continuous and
peaceful display of State authority." The decision granted
"superior" rather than perfected title to the Netherlands because it
had not "effectively occupied" the island to a degree sufficient to
perfect title.'67
In both of these cases, neither of the prevailing states achieved
effective occupation. Along these lines, it has been suggested that
"a relatively slight exercise of authority is sufficient where no state
can show a superior claim."'' 8 The court in Eastern Greenland per-
haps indicated the level of involvement necessary to resolve sover-
eignty issues when it stated: "In most of the cases involving claims
to territorial sovereignty which have come before an international
tribunal, there have been two competing claims to sovereignty, and
the tribunal has had to decide which of the two is the stronger."'",
Thus, on the basis of Eastern Greenland and Island of Palmas, it
would appear that in cases where states are competing over claims
to uninhabited territories, the international decisionmaker will
make an award of sovereign title to one of the states if it can show
a long period of undisputed authority over the claimed territory,
even if its activities in regard to that territory are relatively insignif-
icant.
Insofar as the occupation of Antarctica is concerned, there were
no permanent settlements or continuous activities by any state until
after World War II.170 By 1952, however, there were at least seven-
teen permanent stations in the area of the Antarctic peninsula,
167. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the arbitral award stated in part:
These facts at least constitute a beginning of establishment of sovereignty by
continuous and peaceful display of state authority, or a commencement of occu-
pation of an island not yet forming a part of the territory of a state; and such a
state of things would create in favor of the Netherlands an inchoate title for
completing the conditions of sovereignty. Such inchoate title, based on display
of state authority, would, in the opinion of the arbitrator, prevail over an inchoate
title derived from discovery, especially if the latter title has been left for a very
long time without completion by occupation; and it would equally prevail over
any claim which, in equity, might be deduced from the notion of contiguity.
Id.
168. J. BRIERLY, supra note 145, at 164.
169. [19331 P.C.I.J. 22, 46, ser. A/B, No. 53.
170. See Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 318. Because of the lack of actual settlement in
the areas claimed, it had been the policy of the United States since 1924 to refrain from
asserting any claims itself as well as refusing to recognize those claims made by other states.
Id. This position has since become known as the Hughes Doctrine. For more detailed consider-
ation, see note 25 and accompanying text supra.
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maintained by Chile, Argentina and the United Kingdom.' With
the advent of the I.G.Y. in 1957, the construction of research sta-
tions intensified throughout Antarctica. 2
While this increased activity could possibly be termed
"administrative" acts, I.G.Y. participants had a "gentlemens'
agreement" to the effect that it was not to be used as the basis of
claims.' Thus, there is some question regarding the propriety of
urging those pursuits as evidence of any form of effective occupa-
tion. Considering the nature and degree of activities undertaken
prior to the I.G.Y., however, it can generally be concluded that the
existing sovereignty claims to Antarctica represent a broad range in
kind and degree of inchoate titles. Although England' may be con-
sidered to have conducted activities which more closely approached
a continuous display of authority than did, for instance, Australia,'75
England's claim is challenged by Chile and Argentina,' while Aus-
tralia's claim has been virtually undisputed since the time of its
declaration.
The varying degrees of inchoate titles possessed by the Antarc-
tic claimant states would probably prevail over competing claims
lodged by other states if any case or controversy were brought before
171. P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 23, at 142 (answers the question of the
possibility of permanent establishments). For a discussion of Argentine, Chilean and British
occupation in Antarctica, see Gould, supra note 10, at 22-23.
172. See generally Gould, supra note 10, at 35-41.
173. See, e.g., P. JEssuP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 23, at 155-56 (because of the
gentlemens' agreement, the United States terminated its former practice of placing markers
and flags in places it had surveyed).
174. In discussing the relative worth of various Antarctic claims, one commentator has
stated:
Great Britain appears to have been the first claimant to attempt effective occupa-
tion. The governor of the Falkland Islands in 1906 issued regulations on whaling
operations carried out from land stations on South Georgia and other islands in
the area. In 1908 Britain formally proclaimed a section of the Antarctic and four
nearby groups of islands as the Falkland Island Dependencies, and brought the
administration of the area under the authority of the governor of the Falkland
Islands. From this period, Great Britain has enforced regulations concerning the
whaling industry in the region, established post offices and issued stamps, con-
structed both temporary and permanent bases, operated wireless stations, policed
the area, and carried out exploratory mapping and scientific studies.
LAW IN SPACE, supra note 46, at 861.
175. Australia, whose territorial claim in Antarctica is by far the largest (about one-third
of the continent), bases this interest primarily on the explorations of several Englishmen in
the nineteenth century and of the Australian, Douglas Mawson, in the twentieth century. P.
JEsSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 23, at 152. In discussing the incorporation of Australian
Antarctic Territory into the legal structure of the Australian Capital Territory, one commen-
tator stated: "It was as though the District of Columbia had been enlarged to include
Alaska." W. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 123. See also note 20 supra.
176. For a detailed treatment of the British, Chilean and Argentine claim dispute, see
Hayton, supra note 23, at 583-97. See also notes 23-24 supra.
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an international decisionmaking body. The only possible exception
to this would be potential superior claims asserted by the United
States and the Soviet'Union. It would appear, therefore, that these
respective inchoate titles are tangible to the extent that they must
be settled in any effort to resolve the Antarctic resource problem.
E. The Effect of the Antarctic Treaty on Sovereignty Claims
The Antarctic Treaty seems to preclude the use of activities
undertaken since the Treaty went into effect as a basis for improv-
ing former sovereignty claims or asserting new ones.'77 One commen-
tator, however, while acknowledging that such activities could not
be used while the Treaty is in effect, noted that it would be impossi-
ble to ignore the existence of scientific camps constructed during the
Treaty period. 7 He concluded that stations which remain in opera-
tion after the termination of the Treaty could then be offered to
support new or improved claims. 7 ' Only those activities conducted
after the termination of the Treaty, albeit from stations established
during the operative Treaty period, could be used to assert claims,
just as the physical presence of the station would be considered to
exist legally only at the expiration of the Treaty.'8 °
While the Treaty may be amended by unanimous agreement at
any time,' there is no formal termination date, only a mechanism
177. The Antarctic Treaty provides:
No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sover-
eignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new
claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present
Treaty is in force.
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. IV(2).
178. Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 315. In reaching this assessment, the author argued:
If the existence of bases cannot be gainsaid, and if the right to such bases
can be said to inure to any state, the logical recipient of such a right would
preforce be the building and occupying state. And as the Treaty was ab initio but
a temporary arrangement, it would be irrational to presume that any state would
consent upon signing the Treaty to surrendering the investments of the "Treaty
years" upon termination of that instrument.
Id. at 315 n.56.
179. Id. at 314-16. The Treaty also provides that nothing in the document shall be
interpreted as a renunciation of any claim which a party "may" have. Antarctic Treaty, supra
note 4, art. IV(1)(b). It is possible that the use of the word "may" could be construed to signify
a possibility in the future. Bernhardt reached this interpretation by examining the parallel
French text which states this provision of the Treaty in the conditional tense. The use of the
conditional tense in French is more closely akin to the future tense than to the present tense.
Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 312-13 & n.50.
180. Bernhardt did, however, suggest that it might be politic to disassociate such sta-
tions from the Treaty regime by rededicating them, in addition to replacing the former team
with different personnel. Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 315.
181. Antarctica Treaty, supra note 4, art. XII(1).
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instituting a review of the document in 1991.112 Any party may with-
draw from the Treaty, effective four years after notice of an undesir-
able treaty modification." 3 Moreover, a country could conceivably
withdraw within two years, if there were a proposed amendment
outstanding for two years at the time of notice of withdrawal.
Since any structures existing at the termination of the Treaty
could be used to support sovereignty claims only as of the moment
the Treaty ends, it is probable that the short term of the legal
existence of the building would not add sufficient support to give
any state's inchoate title a perfected status. The presence of one
state's scientific research station in a territory covered by sector
claims of another would only diminish the display of authority of
the sector claimant, not increase the other's claim.
IV. THE RISKS OF CONTINUING THE STATUS QUO IN ANTARCTICA
Because of the inchoate status of Antarctic sovereignty claims,
there is a legal and political vacuum relevant to potential resource
exploration and exploitation activities. If current consumption pat-
terns continue, economic exigencies could force the initiation of
hydrocarbon exploration activities on the continental shelf of Ant-
arctica in the near future. Any such initiation of resource activities
without the benefit of a recognized legal order pertaining to those
activities presents a wide range of potential problems and attendant
risks. The most sensitive aspect of resource development is probably
the potential conflict which the unregulated initiation of resource
activities could create in relation to the Antarctic sovereignty
claims. 
182. Id. art. XII(2)(a), which provides:
If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry into force of the
present Treaty, any of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled
to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX so requests by a
communication addressed to the depositary Government, a Conference of all the
Contracting Parties shall be held as soon as practicable to review the operation
of the Treaty.
Even though the Treaty does not provide any specific date for termination, the Treaty
regime is generally regarded as being only temporary, ending in 1991-30 years after the
Treaty went into force. Bernhardt, supra note 88, at 310-11.
183. Antarctica Treaty, supra note 4, art. XII(2)(c) provides:
If any such modification or amendment has not entered into force. . . within
a period of two years after the date of its communication to all the Contracting
Parties, any Contracting Party may at any time after the expiration of that period
give notice to the depositary Government of its withdrawal from the present
Treaty; and such withdrawal shall take effect two years after the receipt of the
notice by the depositary Government.
184. The Antarctic Treaty fails to address the issue of the initiation of resource activities
by contracting parties in the area. A meeting of experts from the original 12 Treaty members
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Several jurisdictional problems may arise concerning krill ex-
ploitation, which exploitation has already begun in Antarctica. 5f
The Antarctic Treaty expressly provides that all the freedoms of the
high seas are still available to all states under international law. The
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas 8' includes fishing as one
of the high seas freedoms. Nevertheless, krill fishing could cause
conflict if conducted within the marine areas comprehended by the
respective sector claims. Moreover, krill exploitation activities con-
ducted within two hundred miles of the coast of the respective sector
claims could provoke claimant states to declare two hundred mile
exclusive fishing zones, economic zones or other forms of extended
marine jurisdiction 17 in derogation of the prohibition of the Treaty
was held by the Nansen Foundation in 1973, and three distinct views emerged on this subject.
Nansen Foundation Report, supra note 77.
One view postulates that any commercial mineral exploration in Antarctica would vio-
late the Treaty. Since scientific research is one of the main objectives of the Treaty, continu-
ing commercial exploration would contaminate the Treaty area and reduce its utility for
study as an uncontaminated ecosystem. Id. at 79.
This, view has been criticized, however, on grounds that current scientific investigation
in Antarctica is often indistinguishable from commercial exploitation. Id. at 81. For a discus-
sion of the similarity between "scientific" and "commercial" acivities, see N.Y. Times, Jan.
17, 1977, at 35, col. 4. It is reasonable to suggest that many forms of "research activity" could
alter the ecosystem of Antarctica just as much as many forms of commercial exploration. See
Rose, Antarctic Condominium: Building a New Legal Order for Commercial Interests,
MARINE TECH. Soc'Y J. 19, 20-23 (Jan. 1976).
Another view expressed in the Nansen Foundation Report suggests that even though the
Treaty is silent on the question of commercial exploration and exploitation, certain provisions
of the Preamble and Article X imply a prohibition on resource activities by anyone, including
sector claimants, without the consent of the Consultative Parties. Nansen Foundation Re-
port, supra note 77, at 79. This view lacks merit as to states not party to the Treaty since
the provisions of the Treaty are probably not binding on them. As to Treaty members, this
view is also of dubious validity since the Treaty does not specifically address issues engen-
dered by the potential initiation of resource activities. Id. at 79-80.
The final view expressed in the Nansen Foundation Report advances the proposition that
the Treaty does not operate to prohibit Treaty members from initiating resource activities in
Antarctica. This view is based on the failure of the Treaty to address the issue of resource
activites and the belief that none of its provisions even implies a prohibition on resource
activities. The suggestion was also made that engaging in resource activities is a "peaceful
purpose" referred to in Article I of the Treaty and is a matter "about which the consultative
parties may consult under Article IX." Id. at 80.
185. Krill are small, shrimp-like organisms which feed on plant, animal and organic
detrital material. These protein-rich crustaceans are found in abundant quantities in Antarc-
tic waters. Some fishery experts believe that as much as one million tons of krill could be
taken annually without depleting krill stocks. 1 SCAR/SCOR GROUP OF SPECIALISTS ON LIVING
RESOURCES OF THE SOUTHERN OCEAN, BIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION OF MARINE ANTARCTIC SYSTEMS
AND STOCKS (BIOMASS) 1 (1977).
186. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 86, at art. 2. Note, however, that the
Antarctic Treaty does not expressly authorize fishing in the waters included within the
respective sector claims.
187. A two hundred mile exclusive economic zone for fishing and other resource activities
has been claimed by a few countries, and the concept is supported by many more. See
Informal Composite Negotiating Text of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10.
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against new claims or claim enlargements.' Such zones could result
in the destruction of the Antarctic Treaty. Additionally, because
sovereignty claims are only recognized among some of the claimant
states, it is probable that any possible claims to offshore krill re-
sources would not be recognized by other states.
The unregulated initiation of oil and gas exploration on the
continental shelf of Antarctica has the potential for an even more
profound confrontation between foreign exploiters and claimant
states. It could cause claimant states to declare openly sovereignty
over the resources of the continental shelves adjacent to their re-
spective sector claims. These claims could be based upon the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf which provided that
coastal states have sovereignty over their respective adjacent conti-
nental shelves for exploration and exploitation of natural re-
sources.' Claimant states might also argue that, pursuant to the
North Sea Continental Shelf Case,'"" sovereignty over their re-
spective continental shelves for resource exploitation vested ipso
facto upon the declaration of their respective sovereignty claims. 9'
Therefore, they could argue that their presumptive rights over the
continental shelves adjacent to their sector claims could not be
construed as a new claim or as an enlargement of an existing claim,
both of which are prohibited by the Antarctic Treaty."2 Because
only claimant states recognize the Antarctic sovereignty claims,
however, it is likely that potential claims to the oil and gas resources
of the continental shelf of Antarctica would not be recognized by
states other than the existing sector claimants. Moreover, non-
claimant Treaty parties may regard such claims as violative of the
Antarctic Treaty.'9 3 Conflicts over Antarctic offshore hydrocarbon
188. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. IV(2). See notes 75-76 and accompanying text
supra.
189. Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958. art. 2(1),
15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force June 10, 1964).
190. [19691 I.C.J. 4.
191. The North Sea Continental Shelf Case stated:
(Tihe Court entertains no doubt [that] the most fundamental of all the rules
of law relating to the continental shelf, enshrined in Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention, though quite independent of it [is] that the rights of the coastal
State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolon-
gation of its land territory into and under the sea exist ispo facto and ab initio,
by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise
of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its
natural resources. In short, there is here an inherent right. In order to exercise it,
no special legal process has to be gone through, nor have any special legal acts to
be performed.
Id. at 22.
192. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. IV(2).
193. Id.
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deposits could also result between foreign exploiters and claimant
parties.
There are many problems that could arise upon initiation of
any Antarctic resource activity which could lead to the destruction
of the Antarctic Treaty as well as to conflicts among competing
states and Treaty parties. The unilateral issuance of offshore hydro-
carbon exploration leases by a sector claimant is one example of a
situation with potentially serious consequences. The Treaty mem-
ber claimant could argue that such an act would be within the
"peaceful purposes" apparently allowed by the Preamble and Arti-
cle I of the Treaty. 9'
It is also foreseeable that the unilateral issuance of a petroleum
exploratory lease by a territorial claimant would elicit objections
from both consultative'95 and acceding states"6 which have not rec-
ognized Antarctic sovereignty claims. This disapproval could be
manifested in the initiation of a proposed amendment by a Consult-
ative Party pursuant to Article XII of the Treaty.' 7 Such a proposed
amendment could seek to delay or prohibit the issuance of explora-
tion and exploitation leases until such time as the Consultative
Parties could agree on how resource activities should be regulated.
The possible ramifications of such a proposed amendment are
manifold. First, a unanimous vote would be required for the passage
of such an amendment.' The proposal would probably fail to re-
ceive unanimous approval because the claimant Consultative Party
issuing the lease is likely to veto it. Thus, the amendment would
probably not enter into force. Second, the failure of the proposed
amendment would provide a basis for allowing any contracting
party, not just the lease-issuing state, to withdraw from the
Treaty.'99 Thus, other claimant states might elect to withdraw at
that time if their perceived interests so dictated, e.g., in order to
issue their own leases or to claim a two hundred mile economic zone.
Moreover, those Treaty members not currently asserting sover-
eignty claims might also elect to withdraw either in protest or per-
haps in order to assert sovereignty claims of their own.
The synergistic effect of these events would present a signifi-
cant danger to the efficacy of the Antarctic Treaty. Similarly, the
194. Id. Preamble & art. I. See generally notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra.
195. The Consultative Parties not asserting territorial claims are: Belgium, Japan, Po-
land, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Union of South Africa, also a Consultative
Party, claims an island within the Treaty area but asserts no sector claim. See note 52 supra.
196. For a list of acceding states, see note 64 supra.
197. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. XII. See generally notes 69-71, 181-83 and
accompanying text supra.
198. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. XII.
199. Id. art. XII (2)(c).
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death knell to the Treaty. would probably sound if nonclaimant
Treaty parties were to lodge competing claims of resource jurisdic-
tion in Antarctica. If the effects of the Treaty were so neutralized,
the world community would no longer have the benefit of the globe's
only demilitarized continent. Moreover, the Treaty's emphasis on
conservation and maintenance of environmental integrity would
likely be lost in a rush to exploit the wealth of Antarctica. Conse-
quences equally deleterious to Antarctica could also occur through
the unregulated initiation of resource activities by states not party
to the Treaty or by large multinational corporations of ambiguous
state origin.
The commencement of resource exploitation, without the bene-
fit of a recognized agreement, would in all likelihood evoke a nega-
tive response from the other members of the international com-
munity. A significant interest in Antarctica is already evident
among states not party to the Treaty.00 Members of the "Group of
77"201 have become increasingly aware of the feasibility of including
Antarctica in the area to be regulated by the proposed international
authority for the seabed. This would then allow them to share in any
exploitation of Antarctic wealth."'
Thus, any delay in taking immediate action toward a new,
internationally acknowledged legal ordering of Antarctica will only
make resolution of the Antarctic resource problem more difficult to
achieve. As the demand for new sources of living and nonliving
resources increases on a global scale, the economics of Antarctic
exploitation rapidly approaches cost-benefit feasibility. When
global resource demand has caused potential Antarctic resource ac-
tivities to reach the point of economic feasibility, states might be
forced by rational self-interest to take a harder line on the issue of
resources in the southern polar region.
A majority of the experts meeting a the Nansen Foundation,
referring to Antarctic offshore hydrocarbon potential, decided that
it was "urgent for the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties to reach
agreement on adequate political and legal measures to be taken
within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty"20 3 in order to avoid
200. See Mitchell, Antarctica: A Special Case, OCEANS, 56, 58-59 (May-June 1977)
(signs of a growing discontent among the non-Treaty members of the international commu-
nity regarding any preferential rights which might inure to Treaty parties).
201. The "Group of 77" is a coalition of more than one hundred third world countries
which are seeking to enlarge their influence in maritime politics. This heterogeneous group
consists of both landlocked and coastal states. It should also be noted that two Consultative
Parties to the Antarctic Treaty, Argentina and Chile, are members of the "group."
202. See Shapley, Antarctic Problems: Tiny Krill to Usher in New Resource Era, 196
SCIENCE 503, 505 (1977).
203. Nansen Foundation Report, supra note 77, at 75. A minority view which emerged
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unregulated commercial activity on the continental shelf of Antarc-
tica. The Nansen group concluded their report as follows: "The
group hopes that it will also be possible to establish the necessary
legal dispositions before mineral exploration and exploitation gets
under way-with or against the will of the Contracting Parties. 20 4
While the Antarctic Treaty establishes the skeletal structure of
a legal order, it fails to provide a solution to sovereignty issues that
exist among Treaty members. It has been suggested that contract-
ing parties who do not recognize the sovereignty claims of other
Treaty members could initiate nonliving resource exploitation at
their will.205 These activities will be limited only by Treaty provi-
sions such as those designed to preserve the environmental integrity
of the continent 20 or to ban nuclear explosions0 7 and not by the
asserted sovereignty claims of fellow Treaty members. Yet even
those applicable Treaty sections do not provide a legal order rele-
vant to most of the international community. Although Article X2"0
provides a basis for action by contracting parties if nonsignatories
commence resource exploitation, these agreements have no direct
effect on them. At most, the Treaty may be read to provide some
indirect restraints on the activities of these states;29 the Treaty,
however, does not bind nonsignatories to its provisions.2 10
from the meeting suggested that the matter, while important, was not urgent. Id.
204. Id. at 84.
205. Mitchell, supra note 200, at 59 (clash between claimants and nonclaimants raises
doubts as to whether parties to the Treaty could reach an overall agreement concerning re-
source activities).
206. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX(1)(f).
207. Id. art. V.
208. Article X provides that: "Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert ap-
propriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one
engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes of the present
Treaty." Id. art. X.
209. The only provisions of the Treaty which might affect the initiation of resource
activities by nonsignatory states are Articles III and VII. In Article III, the contracting parties
agree that "to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation" information
concerning plans for scientific programs, personnel and observations in Antarctica would be
exchanged "to the greatest extent feasible and practicable." Id. art. III. Such an obligation
is not specifically restricted to contracting parties and may be read to apply to nonsignatories
as well.
In much the same way, Article VII provides that contracting parties are entitled to
designate inspectors with "complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of
Antarctica." Id. art. VII. The Treaty does not specifically limit this right of inspection to the
activities of the contracting parties. It apparently recognizes the right of Treaty parties to
inspect a ship of nonsignatory registry even though such an inspection would violate "flag
sovereignty" of the nonsignatory state. See Bassiouni, Theories of Jurisdiction and Their
Application in Extradition Law and Practice, 5 CAL. W. INTr'L L.J. 1, 19-20 (1974). Bassiouni
explained that "vessels, aircraft and spacecraft are an extension of the territory [of the flag
state] and, therefore, the territoriality theory applies to them by extension." Id. at 19.
210. See Rose, supra note 184, at 20; but cf. Nansen Foundation Report, supra note 77,
at 81 (experts expressed the opinion that "the Parties to the Antarctic Treaty had under-
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The status quo in Antarctica with regard to potential initiation
of resource activities is one of legal and political uncertainty. A
practicable solution must be found to maintain the fragile Antarctic
ecosystem and to provide for orderly resource development without
creating extreme international dissension. Any -further delays will
only promote greater intractability on the part of all states con-
cerned and increase the likelihood of a resource "strike," accen-
tuated by the subsequent disorder which would inevitably result
from the unilateral initiation of resource activities. Antarctic re-
sources could assume such a high priority that powerful states may
become entirely unwilling to grant concessions to an internationally
acknowledged Antarctic resource solution. National interests could
conceivably dictate unilateral actions in overt disregard of the inter-
ests of other states with potentially undesirable consequences for
the international community.
V. WORKING TOWARDS A SOLUTION OF THE ANTARCTIC RESOURCE
PROBLEM
A. General Considerations
From an international perspective there are certain objectives
that solution to the Antarctic resource problem might ideally
achieve. These include: (1) the continued demilitarization of Ant-
arctica; (2) the continued freedom of scientific investigation and
compulsory sharing of scientific information; (3) the maintenance
of the environmental integrity of Antarctica; (4) the political stabili-
zation of Antarctica through the establishment of a legal regime
sufficient to provide security for investment necessary to commence
resource activities; and (5) the orderly and efficient exploitation and
sharing of Antarctic resources for the common well-being of the
international community.
While it is a simple exercise to list the laudable goals of a
solution to the Antarctic resource problem, it is exceedingly difficult
to construct a plan for implementation which would be workable
and acceptable to all interested states."' To create a solution to the
taken certain obligations in respect to the Antarctic and had therefore certain rights vis-A-
vis non-Parties to the Treaty.").
211. The problems involved in attempting to establish an international solution are
illustrated in Evan Luard's analysis of the underlying motivation of individual governments.
He suggested that:
Governments exist-or believe they exist-to protect national interests. They
recognize, in a theoretical way, the need for solutions which promote the wider
interests of all mankind. But they assume that such solutions can only be the end
product of a flight: of bitter and protracted wrangling among many different
representatives, each bargaining for their own nation, rather than from a com-
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Antarctic resource problem, all possible mutually acceptable ar-
rangements should be analyzed. A realistic goal might be any solu-
tion that would preclude the potential consequences of inaction, and
would still be acceptable to enough members of the international
community to afford it a lasting effectiveness.
The following considerations are relevant to the practicability
of any proposed solution to the resource problem: (1) control over
all Antarctic resource activities; (2) control over all activities which
may affect the Antarctic ecosystem; (3) access to Antarctic re-
sources; (4) distribution of monetary gains derived from resource
activities; (5) access to Antarctica for scientific, commercial and
military purposes.
Moreover, any solution may have to deal with the following
factors: (1) the sovereignty claims of the seven claimant Consulta-
tive Parties which arguably could include claims to portions of the
continental shelf of Antarctica; (2) potential claims to territorial
seas, exclusive fishing zones or "economic resource zones" stem-
ming from the sovereignty claims; (3) the overlapping claims of
Chile, Argentina and the United Kingdom; (4) the unclaimed sec-
tor; (5) the proprietary sensitivities of the nonclaimant Consultative
Parties; and (6) assertions that Antarctica is an international zone
not susceptible to sovereignty claims and thus is part of the
"common heritage of mankind." '
For purposes of analysis, the countries of the world can be div-
ided into three competing interest groups: the claimant Consulta-
tive Parties, the nonclaimant Consultative Parties and the non-
Treaty states.
mon, disinterested effort among all to devise the system that would best serve the
interests and promote the welfare of the world as a whole. They accept the need
for mutually acceptable arrangements. But their first aim is to ensure that the
arrangements are acceptable to themselves. This is the inevitable effect of a
situation in which political power and political parties are still organized on a
national rather than an international basis.
E. LUARD, THE CONTROL OF THE SEA-BED 197 (1974).
212. Attempting to define the phrase, "common heritage of mankind," Ambassador
Arvid Pardo of Malta identified three characteristics:
First of all there is the absence of property. The common heritage engenders
the right to use certain property, but not to own it. It implies the management of
property and the obligation of the international community to transmit the com-
mon heritage, including resources and values, in historical terms. Common heri-
tage implies management. Management not in the narrow sense of management
of resources, but management of all uses. Third, common heritage implies sharing
of benefits.
Note, The Polar Regions and the Law of the Sea, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 204, 215-16 (1976).
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B. Common Interests of Claimant Consultative Parties
The claimant Consultative Parties have a common interest in
securing their perceived sovereignty rights over respective Antarctic
sectors. While some claimants, such as the United Kingdom, have
indicated that they might be agreeable to an international solu-
tion,213 others such as Australia, New Zealand, and especially Chile
and Argentina, have indicated that their claims are not negotia-
ble."' The basic problem confronting claimant states stems from the
lack of general recognition of their claims, even by nonclaimant
Consultative Parties. Until they acquire general recognition, claim-
ants may not be able to exploit the natural resources of their sector.
Furthermore, sector claimants face the prospect of losing their pre-
ceived exclusive rights if an "international solution" is effected by
the international community. To obviate these problems, claimants
may decide to reduce their claims of exclusive sovereignty in order
to obtain recognition of lesser proprietary rights.
C. Common Interests of Nonclaimant Consultative Parties
Nonclaimant Consultative Parties may assert that their inter-
ests in Antarctica have now vested. The length of their connection
with the Antarctic Treaty and the scope of their activities in the
southern polar region could support such a contention. Perhaps the
most significant of these interests is future access to the potentially
rich hydrocarbon resources of the continental shelf of Antarctica.
Japan has long been a heavy importer of foreign oil. The United
States now imports fifty-one percent of all the hydrocarbon fuel it
consumes."' The Soviet Union as well will soon be dependent on
foreign reserves of oil.216 The increased capacity of oil exporting
states to withhold hydrocarbons from the industrialized states was
illustrated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) in 1973. That experience precipitated a reevaluation of the
Antarctic policy of the United States which was previously viewed
as an "international approach. '21 Today, the United States appar-
ently favors free access and "nonpreferential rules applicable to all
countries and nations for any possible development of resources in
the future. ' 218 The experience of the United States during the oil
213. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
214. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1977, at 35, col. 4.
215. See Miami Herald, Feb. 20, 1977, § A, at 24, col. 1. In 1976, the United States
imported 41% of the oil that it needed. STATISTICAL REP. Div., U.S. DEP'T OF COM., STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 750 (1977).
216. Miami Herald, Apr. 19, 1977, § A, at 16, col. 1.
217. See Hayton, supra note 23, at 584.
218. Antarctic Policy Hearing, supra note 77, at 5.
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crises of 1973 has caused those concerned to realize that disruption
of access to foreign oil is the equivalent of a security threat.'" It is
not presumptuous to suggest that Japan and the Soviet Union share
these same concerns. Therefore, it appears that freedom of access
to Antarctic hydrocarbons would also be one of their primary objec-
tives in any future solution to the Antarctic resource problem.
Although they may seek to advance only their own interests,
the nonclaimant Consultative Parties may have to make conces-
sions to achieve a solution which would receive general recognition.
Without general acceptance by the international community, it is
probable that no solution to the Antarctic resource problem would
be lasting.
In any possible negotiations, nonclaimant Consultative Parties
will probably not be able to dictate their policies to the lesser devel-
oped states. In recent years, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United
States have become increasingly dependent on the developing states
for supplies of natural resources and for military and commercial
mobility. Previously, the underdeveloped countries could achieve
their national goals by exploiting the Cold War competition be-
tween the East and West. Now that d6tente has ended the Cold
War, the less developed states have begun to exploit the dependency
of developed states to achieve their aims.2 In order to avoid alienat-
ing developing-countries, the claimant states will need to gain Third
World approval of any solution to the resource development prob-
lem. The extent of concessions which the nonclaimant Consultative
Parties will choose to make will depend on the priorities which they
attach to achieving their goals in Antarctica.
The unique features of the Antarctic region-its abundance of
marine living resources and strategic location-stimulate competi-
tive international interests which may complicate efforts to reach a
generally acceptable solution. As a result of the importance of fish
in the food supplies of Japan and the Soviet Union, those states may
desire freedom of access to the potentially enormous Antarctic krill
fishery.2 ' Additionally, the United States, Japan and the Soviet
219. See A. HOLLICK & R. OSGOOD, NEW ERA OF OCEAN POLrncs 87 (1974) (disruptions of
America's access to oil poses economic threat to domestic welfare tantamount to a security
threat).
220. See id. at 89-90. The authors argued that "one of the primary U.S. security impera-
tives may become the achievement of mutually advantageous and acceptable working rela-
tionships with the coastal states in the Third World." Id. at 90. For a discussion of the
opportunity available to developing countries to use their natural resources as leverage for
political pressure and harassment, see Bergsten, The Threat From the Third World, 15
FOREIGN POL'Y 102, 107-24 (Summer 1973).
221. See generally Lohr, Krill, 10 OCEANS 54 (May-June 1977) (Japan and the Soviet
Union were the first countries to conduct systematic studies to develop methods for captur-
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Union may establish commercial and military mobility as one of
their priorities, and may reject any solution which does not grant
them the right of transit for such traffic in the Antarctic seas and
airspace.
D. Common Interests of Non-Treaty States
The states of the world community that are not Consultative
Parties to the Antarctic Treaty have a wide range of interests in the
future of Antarctica. Countries that rely heavily on the oceans as a
source of food supply may have a significant interest in Antarctic
krill.n2 Others, such as Brazil, 2s may have an interest in the exploi-
tation of the nonliving resources of Antarctica. Oil importing coun-
tries may be interested in the early exploitation of Antarctic hydro-
carbons; oil exporting countries (such as OPEC members) may be
interested in delaying exploitation or at least wielding some control
over such exploitation. All of these states, however, are certainly
aware that any solution to the resource problem designed for the
exclusive benefit of the Consultative Parties would not be in their
interest. They might favor an approach that would provide them
with some early benefit or, in the alternative, an approach that
would give them time to acquire the technology necessary for them
to be competitive Antarctic exploiters.
Because of the range and complexity of the often divergent
national interests involved, any workable and internationally recog-
nized solution to the Antarctic resource problem would be invalua-
ble. While it would be difficult to design a solution acceptable to
the Consultative Parties alone, the task of satisfying the more than
one hundred other members of the international community will be
far more arduous. Yet, such a solution must be attempted.
VI. THE VIABILITY OF FOUR POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE ANTARCTIC
RESOURCE PROBLEM
The four potentially viable solutions to the Antarctic resource
problem which merit consideration are: (1) an international solu-
tion; (2) a solution whereby the Antarctic sovereignty claims would
ing and processing Antarctic krill); Shapley, supra note 202, at 504 (Japan and the Soviet
Union market krill for human consumption).
222. See generally Lohr, supra note 221, at 54. A total of eight countries have seriously
investigated Antarctic krill potential. Among them are the following Consultative Parties:
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland and the Soviet Union. Other interested
states are Taiwan and West Germany. Id. See also Shapley, supra note 202, at 504 (tech-
nological breakthroughs by West Germans will make large scale harvesting possible).
223. See Shapley, Antarctica: World Hunger for Oil Spurs Security Council Review,
184 SCIENCE 776 (1974) (Brazil interested in South Pole oil deposits).
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be recognized by the Consultative Parties; (3) a solution whereby
the International Court of Justice would determine the relative sta-
tus of Antarctic sovereignty claims; and (4) a solution wherein the
Consultative Parties would "pool" their respective sovereignty
claims and declare an Antarctic condominium or joint Antarctic
sovereignty.
A. An International Solution
States not party to the Antarctic Treaty have become progres-
sively more interested in the future of Antarctica. These countries
would naturally favor an international solution to the resource prob-
lem in Antarctica rather than a more exclusive approach in which
they might realize little economic or political benefit. The principle
advantage of an international approach is that it would include the
entire international community and would thus eliminate many of
the grounds for objections which could be raised under an approach
involving an exclusive group of participants. That sole advantage,
however, would probably be outweighed by a number of disadvan-
tages which cast doubt upon the feasibility of an international solu-
tion.
An international solution could be developed by: (1) an interna-
tional convention to create a new Antarctic Treaty intitated by the
United Nations General Assembly; (2) an international trusteeship
under the Charter of the United Nations," 4 or under an amendment
specifically designed for Antarctica; or (3) the assimilation of all or
part of the Antarctic Treaty area by the seabed authority as envi-
sioned by some of the parties to the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 11).225
The feasibility of an international solution through a new con-
vention involving all interested participants or through an interna-
tional trusteeship is doubtful due to the potency of some of the
sovereignty claims.22 Furthermore, international regulation of re-
source exploitation in Antarctica would be extremely difficult to
implement due to the diverse national interests and priorities of the
international community. The slow and almost frustrating progress
of UNCLOS III is an indication of the obstacles encountered in an
attempt to resolve these complex issues. Thus, the need for an early
resolution apparently precludes an approach through an interna-
224. See U.N. CHARTER art. 81. The provisions of Article 81 would permit a trusteeship
agreement to be administered by the United Nations or by one or more of its members.
225. See Rose, supra note 184, at 24 (Law of the Sea Conference could provide a basis
for outside, nonsignatory intervention in the Antarctic Treaty area).
226. See generally N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1977, at 35, col.4; see also note 230 infra.
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tional convention or trusteeship. Finally, the manifestation of pro-
prietary sensitivities by nonclaimant Consultative Parties227 sug-
gests that they might also vigorously oppose an international solu-
tion."'
The feasibility of an approach which would include Antarctica
in the regime envisioned by UNCLOS III is also problematic. The
addition of Antarctica to the complex package deal UNCLOS III
negotiators are endeavoring to achieve could lead to a substantial
reconsideration of priorities by the participants and could result in
a significant setback in the progress accomplished thus far. In addi-
tion, the inclusion of the Antarctic resource problem within the
scope of UNCLOS HI might cause some of the Antarctic Treaty
members to withdraw from the Law of the Sea Conference rather
than relinquish their perceived rights in Antarctica."' Thus, the
incorporation of Antarctica into the common heritage concept at
UNCLOS I could result in the collapse of those negotiations.
B. Recognition of Sector Claims by Consultative Parties
The Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty may attempt
to resolve their uncertainties and internal disputes by a general
recognition of all sovereignty claims. This plan would result in the
establishment of coastal states which would be individually admin-
istered by the respective claimant. In addition, Consultative Parties
would specifically restrict their recognition to only those claims cur-
rently asserted, maintaining the Treaty as an operative guideline for
the control of future national or international efforts at exploration
and exploitation.
This solution has several advantages. General recognition
would satisfy the claimant parties, particularly those, like Chile and
Argentina, which have pressed their claims most adamantly. 30
Moreover, division of the area into coastal states would facilitate
227. See generally notes 32-37 and accompanying text supra.
228. See Rose, supra note 184, at 23-24 (United States opposed to the inclusion of the
seabed under the high seas of the Antarctic Treaty area within the jurisdiction of any interna-
tional authority for the deep seabed which might be established by UNCLOS I).
229. A United States Department of State official reportedly said: "Off the record,
Antarctica could blow the Conference right out of the water. Antarctica claimant nations
would rather not have a sea law treaty than one that impaired their sovereignty in Antarc-
tica." Shapley, supra note 202, at 505.
230. See generally Hayton, supra note 23, at 583-97. In Argentina, "[i]ntense popular
interest in these claims had been reported; the younger generation is apparently educated to
assert Argentina's rights 'with a dedication verging on fanaticism."' P. JEssUP & H.
TAUBENFELD, supra note 23, at 147-48 (citations omitted). In Chile, "[s]pecial instruction is
required in the schools stressing Chilean rights and expeditions. As part of their growing
economic and political nationalism Chileans have become extremely conscious of the
'Southland' frontier in general." Id. at 148.
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resource exploitation by obviating the need for producers to negoti-
ate development rights with a cumbersome international regulatory
body." ' Instead, producers could deal directly with the claimant
state to acquire access to both inland and offshore rights in the
claimed sector, as they do in all other parts of the world.
Unfortunately, the political, economic and legal disadvantages
of this plan fatally undermine its feasibility. In such a plan there
is no provision for the settlement of disputes over the overlapping
claims, leaving a source of continuing conflict. The status of the
unclaimed sectors, despite its generalized administration under the
provisions of the Treaty, would be forever disputed by "have-not"
states. Nonclaimant states, latecomers in Antarctica, might raise
strong opposition based on a concern over the potential formation
of an economic cartel among the sector claimants which would re-
duce access to the mineral and living resources of the area. In addi-
tion, since national sovereignty precludes international control,
Treaty members may object to losing their right to govern activities
which might affect the fragile Antarctic ecosystem. Finally, and
perhaps most significantly, states excluded from the agreement
would probably object to its exclusivity, thus denying the solution
any chance for favorable international acceptance in terms of both
its legality or desirability.
C. Submission of Sovereignty Claims to the International Court of
Justice
Voluntary submission of competing Antarctic territorial claims
to the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) for settlement could
result in international recognition of sovereignty claims. Were the
court to confirm a state's claim, its right to the area would have
international respectability, and the decision would be a legitimate
defense against subsequent encroachments. In addition, this solu-
tion would settle disputes over overlapping claims such as those
advanced by Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom.
Considerations exist, however, which cast doubt on the feasibil-
ity of such an approach. There is no assurance that the I.C.J. would
231. See generally Letter from Global Marine Inc., Los Angeles, Cal. to Frank Alexander
(May 20, 1977) (on file at the University of Miami Law Review) wherein a representative of
the company stated:
I believe our preference would be to assign jurisdiction over specific segments of
the Antarctic to each of the Antarctic Treaty contracting nations, and to allow
each country to negotiate or to solicit bids in the manner that each nation does
with its own territory. Our fear would be that a condominium arrangement would
be unwieldy and even slower to move than are the individual nations of the world
today.
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decide that any of the claimant Consultative Parties had a perfected
sovereign title to any territory. A claimant state would hardly be
satisfied if the court restricted its decision to a determination of
which state had a superior inchoate sovereign title to disputed
areas. Yet, a review of the underlying analysis in the decisions of
Clipperton Island,23 2 Island of Palmas2 33 and The Legal Status of
Eastern Greenland 23 indicates that the court might very well reach
such a limited holding rather than elevate one state's claim to a
perfected status.
As previously noted, the settlement of Antarctica has thus far
been restricted to the maintenance of isolated scientific research
stations. In Clipperton Island, effective occupation was defined as
a "series of acts" extending over a period of time which manifests a
state's intention to exercise exclusive control over an area.235 The
arbitrator noted, however, that if a territory were completely unin-
habited, then at the first moment of occupation, the occupying state
would have an "absolute and undisputed disposition" of the area.23
Since several states have conducted research and exploratory activi-
ties subsequent to the first sovereignty claims, Antarctica is hardly
at the disposition of any single state. Faced with this definition of
occupancy and the situation that exists in Antarctica, the I.C.J.
232. Clipperton Island Arbitral Award (France v. Mexico), Jan. 28, 1931, reprinted in
26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932).
233. Island of Palmas Case (United States v. Netherlands), Apr. 4, 1928, reprinted in
22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867 (1928).
234. [1933] P.C.I.J. 22, ser. A/B, No. 53.
235. 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 393. In an analysis of the Clipperton Island opinion, one
commentator suggested that a "series of acts" sufficient to establish effective occupancy is
not accomplished by a single isolated act but rather is an involved process of development
which takes place over a considerable time span:
The great range of activities which have played a role in establishing effective
occupation may be indicated by the following nonhomogenous itemization: the
station of soldiers, erection of forts, maintenance of public order, cruising of
warships in nearby waters, building of post offices, issuing of postage stamps,
granting of licenses for exploitation of resources or exploration, granting of land
and mineral rights, making of treaties with native populations, organizing of local
forms of government, the exploration and mapping of the area, the carrying out
of humanitarian and educational activities among the native population such as
the establishment of missions, hospitals, schools, and research stations, trading
with the native inhabitants, tilling the soil, bringing in settlers, and the building
of communities, harbor installations, roads, and industries.
LAW IN SPACE, supra note 46, at 844 & n.223.
236. 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 394. In reaching this conclusion, the arbitrator stated:
[Ihf a territory, by virtue of the fact that it is completely uninhabited, is, from
the first moment when the occupying state makes its appearance there, at the
absolute and undisputed disposition of that state, from that moment the taking
of possession must be considered as accomplished, and the occupancy is thereby
completed.
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would probably be hesitant to award perfected title to any claim-
ant. 37 Furthermore, an exclusive appropriation award of Antarctic
territories and adjacent portions of the continental shelf would
effectively foreclose other interested states, especially the United
States and the Soviet Union, from making claims in those areas.
If the I.C.J. did decide to restrict its decision to merely a deter-
mination of which competing state had the superior inchoate title,
the result of such a decision would not resolve the Antarctic sover-
eignty issues. Instead, new issues would arise over settlement, fu-
ture sovereignty claims by other states and how long existing in-
choate titles would remain inviolate. Such a result would hardly
solve the Antarctic resource problem.
Even if the I.C.J. were to make a determination that would, in
effect, install the respective claimants as sovereigns in Antarctica,
the above approach would nevertheless be plagued with innumera-
ble difficulties. There is ample reason to believe that the nonclaim-
ant Consultative Parties would not be amenable to the solution
since it would not guarantee them access to Antarctica for scientific
purposes or for resource activity. The establishment of coastal states
in Antarctica could be followed by declarations of offshore marine
jurisdiction, effecting a diminution of areas within the Southern
Ocean currently considered to be part of the high seas. This would
entail undesirable restrictions on the activities of commercial trans-
port, fishing and military vessels operating under the flags of the
nonclaimant Consultative Parties. The remainder of the interna-
tional community might also react negatively to a solution that
would grant the right of appropriation to seven states to the exclu-
sion of all others.
In addition, it is improbable that Chile and Argentina would
submit to the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. They have refused to do so
in the past, 238 and there are no indications that their consistently
intractible positions are softening.23' It is doubtful that they would
agree to I.C.J. jurisdiction to decide the dispute concerning the
237. In Island of Palmas, the arbitrator found there was a series of "unchallenged acts
of peaceful display of Netherlands sovereignty in the period from 1700 to 1906, and which
* . . may be regarded as sufficiently proving the existence of Netherlands sovereignty." 22
AM. J. INT'L L. at 912. In the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J. 22, ser. A/B,
No. 53, the International Court of Justice granted an award of sovereignty to Denmark.
Denmark, by virtue of succession, acquired an interest in the sovereignty exercised by the
then joint King of Denmark and Norway from 1721 to 1814. Subsequently, Denmark engaged
in continuous activities displaying its authority over the territory. No country asserting a
sector claim in Antartica can show an equivalent period of unchallenged acts manifesting a
peaceful display of sovereignty.
238. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
239. See generally note 230 supra.
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overlapping claims in the Antarctic Penninsula area, especially in
view of the duration and extent of English activities there.4 0
D. Joint Antarctic Sovereignty
By "pooling" their rights and interests in the Antarctic Treaty
area, the Consultative Parties could establish a new legal order; this
arrangement has been termed a "condominium" by several com-
mentators.24" ' Such a declaration of joint Antarctic sovereignty by
the Consultative Parties could resolve many sovereignty problems.
A single Antarctic coastal state would arguably be afforded juris-
diction over its continental shelf for purposes of resource exploit-
ation by virtue of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf."' A similar declaration by interested states established a
valid sovereignty claim in the Spitzbergen Treaty.' In that multi-
lateral agreement, Norway was declared sovereign over a group of
islands within the northern polar circle, yet, by virtue of the agree-
ment, other countries were guaranteed access to its resources. The
Spitzbergen Treaty is an example of a possible legal basis for joint
Antarctic sovereignty. The basic criteria for a perfected sovereign
title, general international recognition, would at least be ap-
proached by the mutual recognition of the Treaty members to a
joint Antarctic sovereignty. In its final form, a joint sovereignty
agreement could contain concessions to the interests of the interna-
tional community and could thereby gain recognition, or at least
tacit acceptance by non-Treaty states.
A condominium approach would obviate the necessity of re-
solving the difficult problems created by the overlapping claims of
Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom since these three Con-
sultative Parties could exchange perceived interests in their respec-
tive sector claims for an interest in a much larger whole. Moreover,
the problem of the substantial unclaimed sector in Antarctica might
be resolved since this territory would be comprehended by any joint
240. See note 174 supra. For a comparison of the acts of sovereignty exercised by Argen-
tina, Chile and Great Britain, see P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 23, at 143-50. See
also LAW IN SPACE, supra note 46, at 861-62 (Great Britain most active of all Antarctic
claimants). It is significant to note that "[elven the activities of Great Britain upon the
Antarctic continent could . . scarcely be said to constitute the effective occupation neces-
sary to exclusive appropriation." Id. at 862.
241. See P. JEssuP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 23, at 171-90; Hambro, Some Notes on
the Antarctic Treaty Collaboration, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 221, 224-25; Rose, supra note 184, at
26-27; Nansen Foundation Report, supra note 77, at 81.
242. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 189, at art. 2. Article 2 provides
in pertinent part: "The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for
the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources."
243. Spitzbergen Treaty, Feb. 9, 1920, 2 L.N.T.S. 8.
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sovereignty agreement. Marine boundaries on the continental
shelves adjacent to Antarctic sector claims would also be jointly
held.
This method provides a better legal basis for sovereignty in
Antarctica by virtue of the pooling of activities, and exercises of
authority and occupations by the Consultative Parties. Further-
more, nonclaimant Consultative Parties would gain rights in a new
Antarctic legal order which would ensure their access to Antarctic
resources. This solution could be accomplished either by spawning
joint Antarctic sovereignty by utilizing the framework of the Antarc-
tic Treaty, which has functioned smoothly for eighteen years, or by
creating joint sovereignty independently while retaining the laud-
able goals and objectives of the Treaty. By providing a legal order
and a resource regulatory mechanism, the plan would reduce the
likelihood of any harmful independent resource activity. It would
simultaneously provide sufficient security to encourage investment
by any interested private concerns. Rent income from the resource
leases for commercial activity would accrue in favor of the Consulta-
tive Parties.Although a declaration of joint Antarctic sovereignty would
inure to the common benefit of the Consultative Parties, consolidate
their claims and safeguard their interests, problems accompany
such an approach. A primary difficulty is gaining support from the
claimant Consultative Parties because support of such a scheme
would diminish their individual interests.
Perhaps the most significant problem, however, is the structure
and international status of any new joint Antarctic sovereignty
mechanism. Because Antarctica would become an area of shared
sovereignty, it could not be considered a territorial extension of the
states which would be parties to the joint Antarctic sovereignty
agreement. This raises several questions. To be afforded the status
of a coastal state with sovereignty in the adjacent continental shelf,
would the new legal entity have to be declared a separate and new
independent state? Would it pass its own laws and have its own
legislature?
Another disadvantage of such a proposed solution is that a
declaration of joint Antarctic sovereignty would most likely be con-
strued as a new claim, and thus in derogation of the Antarctic
Treaty.2"' A declaration of joint sovereignty necessarily implies that
each claimant would assert "sovereignty in common" with the other
244. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. IV, which provides in pertinent part: "No
new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall
be asserted while the present Treaty is in force."
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Consultative Parties over all the territory encompassed by the Ant-
arctic Treaty, including the continental shelf of Antarctica. For the
claimant states, this would be a departure from their prior sector
claims and thus would have to be considered as new claims. With
respect to the nonclaimant Consultative Parties, this would be an
assertion of sovereignty claims for the first time. Notwithstanding
the joint nature of the claims, the creation of these new interests
would have to be considered as new claims. Finally, the substantial
unclaimed sector would be claimed for the first time, constituting
another new claim on the part of both claimant and nonclaimant
Consultative Parties.
Although it would be possible to amend the Antarctic Treaty
to provide for a joint Antarctic sovereignty claim, this would consti-
tute an unheralded deviation from the practice established over the
eighteen year period during which the Treaty prohibition against
new or enlarged sovereignty claims was respected. The other states
of the international community, for which the Antarctic Treaty in
effect maintained the continent as an international area, could only
view such a blatant departure from established practice as an at-
tempt to exclude them from Antarctica. Significantly, a declaration
of joint Antarctic sovereignty might be construed, both by develop-
ing and industrial states, as an imperialistic act on the part of the
United States and the Soviet Union.
A joint Antarctic sovereignty approach, however, might also
prove unacceptable to members of the claimant group. A joint asser-
tion of sovereignty would provide claimants with a united front
against potential intervention by an international body, as well as
a common interest in the entire Antarctic continent, in exchange for
relinquishment of a practically unrecognized sector claim. But the
internal political implications to claimant countries could discour-
age such a course of action. This shared sovereignty approach would
probably mandate an express, unequivocal renunciation of respec-
tive sector claims. Additionally, domestic legislation applicable to
sector claims would have to be repealed. In view of the nationalistic
fervor that exists within some of the claimant states over the issue
of sector claims,215 it is doubtful whether local political parties could
or would adopt a joint sovereignty platform.
Apparently none of the four alternative approaches discussed
afford a feasible solution to the Antarctic resource problem because
they all seemingly fail to successfully accommodate the competing
interests of the claimant Consultative Parties, the nonclaimant
Consultative Parties and the remaining countries of the interna-
245. See generally note 230 supra.
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tional community. Of the alternatives considered, the joint Antarc-
tic sovereignty scheme comes closest to incorporating the interests
of the three competing groups. Joint Antarctic sovereignty by syn-
thesizing the interests of both Treaty member groups, would at least
provide equal rights for the claimant and nonclaimant Consultative
Parties while creating a united front against possible outside inter-
vention by other members of the international community.
The joint Antarctic sovereignty approach, however, has several
serious shortcomings: (1) the claimant Consultative Parties would
be forced to publicly disavow their Antarctic sovereignty claims-an
unlikely prospect considering the potentially adverse domestic po-
litical consequences; (2) a declaration of joint Antarctic sover-
eignty would most probably be construed as a new claim and thus
prohibited by the Antarctic Treaty; (3) a declaration of joint Ant-
arctic sovereignty might appear to non-Treaty members as a blatant
attempt by the Treaty parties to appropriate Antarctica for their
exclusive demesne without regard to other interests; and (4) this
solution could terminally disrupt UNCLOS III.
VII. A RECOMMENDED APPROACH
A. Joint Antarctic Resource Jurisdiction (J.A.R.J.)
The unique physical and juridical character of Antarctica re-
quires a sui generis approach to the Antarctic resource problem. It
is recommended that the Consultative Parties declare joint exclu-
sive resource jurisdiction over the continent and the continental
shelf of Antarctica. It is submitted that such "Joint Antarctic Re-
source Jurisdiction" (J.A.R.J.) would provide a legal order which
would be both pertinent to future Antarctic resource activities and
acceptable to the claimant and nonclaimant Consultative Parties,
as well as to the remainder of the international community.
A J.A.R.J. declaration could be implemented pursuant to the
Antarctic Treaty procedures"' and in such a manner as to leave the
Treaty intact."' An additional measure should also be passed con-
current with the J.A.R.J. declaration initiating a five year morato-
rium on nonliving resource activities in Antarctica.4 8 This time
would afford the Consultative Parties ample opportunity to study
246. A J.A.R.J. declaration could be implemented as a measure "in furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Treaty" under Article IX or as an amendment pursuant to
Article XII. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX & XII. For a discussion of modification
procedures, see Nansen Foundation Report, supra note 77, at 81.
247. Since a J.A.R.J. declaration would not technically be a claim of territorial sover-
eignty, Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty (which freezes sovereignty claims in Antarctica)
would need no modification. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. IV.
248. Such a measure could be implemented under Article IX. Id. art. IV.
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the environmental impact of hydrocarbon exploitation on the conti-
nental shelf of Antarctica.
Shelf areas designated as suitable for commercial resource ac-
tivities after the moratorium would then be divided into concession
blocks." '4 All interested states of the world community could bid for
the rights to explore these blocks. Revenues generated through leas-
ing concession blocks for exploration purposes would inure to the
Consultative Parties on an equal basis. Subsequent exploitation of
continental shelf hydrocarbons would then be taxed according to
rates established by the world petroleum market. Revenues gener-
ated through exploitation taxes would inure to both the Consulta-
tive Parties and to a new United Nations trust fund created for the
purpose of aiding underdeveloped states.
Since all Antarctic Treaty provisions would remain operative,
every country would still have an opportunity to accede to the
Treaty and thereafter qualify for consultative status.15 Any state
thus qualified as a Consultative Party would share in J.A.R.J. Ac-
cordingly, no member of the international community would be
foreclosed from an opportunity to share in the nonliving resources
of Antarctica.
A J.A.R.J. declaration would also provide a convenient oppor-
tunity to affirm international access to the living resources of Ant-
arctica. The declaration should expressly provide that the waters of
the Southern Ocean retain the status of high seas. All states would
thus be formally assured of an opportunity to enter into a future
treaty regulating the Antarctic krill fishery 5' concurrent with their
accession to J.A.R.J. This would guarantee, for all countries, con-
tinuing access to Antarctic living resources.
A J.A.R.J. declaration, thus formulated, would afford signifi-
cant inducements to all interested parties to attempt to reach an
Antarctic resource agreement. Consultative claimants and nonclai-
mants, as well as the remainder of the international community,
would benefit from such a declaration.
B. J.A.R.J. and the Claimant Consultative Parties
The J.A.R.J. approach would appeal to the claimant Consulta-
tive Parties for a number of reasons. At the onset, each claimant
249. To expedite resource development, the measure initiating the moratorium should
specifically provide that issues concerning the designation of shelf areas suitable for commer-
cial resource activity and the designation of concession blocks would be decided by a majority
vote rather than the present unanimous requirement. See id. art. IX(4).
250. See id. art. XIII(1).
251. Antarctic krill regulation is currently under discussion by the Consultative Parties.
See Shapley, supra note 202, at 503-05.
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Consultative Party would acquire rights to nonliving resources in all
of continental Antarctica and on the continental shelf. All seven
sector claimants would consolidate their interests in Antarctic non-
living resources with each other and with the nonclaimant Consulta-
tive Parties. This mutual recognition would provide a substantial
line of mutual resistance to intervention by non-J.A.R.J. states en-
deavoring to assert claims of sovereign entitlement or to annex Ant-
arctica as part of "the common heritage of mankind."51 The aggre-
gate strength embodied in a J.A.R.J. accord would be a significant
impediment to the initiation of unregulated resource activity by
non-J.A.R.J. parties. Additionally, because of the common interest
created, any threat of encroachment upon sector claims by non-
J.A.R.J. parties would be extinquished.
A J.A.R.J. agreement would enable Consultative Parties to ex-
ercise considerable control over the administration of Antarctica in
substantive areas such as conservation and environmental protec-
tion.5 3 Consultative Parties would still continue to exercise their
rights as Consultative Parties under the Treaty, including their
right to vote on new members251 and on amendments or modifica-
tions to the Treaty. 5 Finally, because J.A.R.J. establishes a joint
interest in all of Antarctica rather than individual interests in par-
ticular sectors, the problems involved with the overlapping claims
on the Antarctic Penninsula and of the unclaimed sector disappear.
This could be accomplished without requiring claimants to publicly
disavow their nonresource Antarctic sovereignty claims."'2
C. J.A.R.J and the Nonclaimant Consultative Parties
Should a J.A.R.J. approach be achieved, nonclaimant Consult-
ative Parties would benefit as well. Initially, they would be assured
252. See note 212 supra.
253. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX(1)(f).
254. Id. art. XIII(1).
255. Id. art. IX(4).
256. The issue of Antarctic territorial sovereignty, in contrast with the issue of resource
sovereignty, would be left open. This practice has been employed in other cases involving
sovereignty disputes over uninhabited territories. Canton and Enderbury Islands of the Phoe-
nix Island group north of Samoa have been under the joint administration of the United
States and the United Kingdom since 1939. P. JEssuP & H. TAuBENFELD, supra note 23, at
18-20. The uninhabited archipelago of Spitzbergen, located between northern Greenland and
Franz Joseph Land, became the scene of international rivalry over nopliving resource claims
and access for strategic purposes in the early twentieth century. The dispute was resolved in
1920 pursuant to an agreement whereby Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Russia, Sweden and the United States recognized a limited sovereignty over
Spitzbergen. Norway, however, still had access to Spitzbergen's nonliving resources. See
Spitzbergen Treaty, supra note 244. See generally P. JEss P & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note
23, at 34-39.
19781
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
of nondiscriminatory access to the continental shelf of Antarctica
and its hydrocarbons once the five year moratorium ended.27 Be-
cause of the vast energy demands of several of the nonclaimant
Consultative Parties, particularly Japan, the United States and the
Soviet Union, this is a significant advantage.25 In addition, the
possible formation of an OPEC-like hydrocarbon cartel controlling
Antarctic resources would be virtually eliminated.
The continuing status of the Southern Ocean as high seas would
allow nonclaimant Consultative Parties to continue to exercise the
freedoms of the high seas in Antarctic waters. By not recognizing
individual sector claims, a J.A.R.J. agreement would also ensure
continued freedom of transit in Antarctic seas and airspace for non-
claimant Consultative Parties.
If a J.A.R.J. agreement is formed, nonclaimants would function
on an equal basis with claimants. As a result, many of the benefits
which would inure to Treaty claimants would also operate in favor
of nonclaimant Consultative Parties. This package of mutual bene-
fits would include the following: (1) the continued right to protect
the environmental integrity of the continent;25 (2) the security af-
forded by a united front, both in terms of investment security and
protection against intrusion into Antarctic affairs by non-Treaty
members; and (3) the opportunity to enter a future treaty concern-
ing the regulation of Antarctic krill.
D. J.A.R.J. and Nonconsultative Parties
Those members of the international community who have
acceded to the Treaty but who do not have consultative status
should also be amenable to a J.A.R.J. approach since they would
benefit from many of its advantages. The developing countries
among this group would benefit directly from the revenue sharing
provisions, thus acquiring a new, direct economic stake in Antarctic
development with no cost outlay. All states would continue to have
the opportunity to engage in scientific pursuits in the Antarctic
Treaty area in addition to gaining nondiscriminatory access to po-
tential Antarctic resources. The most significant advantage, how-
ever, would be the opportunity afforded all states to accede to the
Treaty and attain consultative status upon meeting the requisites
257. Access would be nondiscriminatory in that all interested parties could bid on an
equal basis for the resource leases. All parties, even claimants, would be expected to pay
royalties for interests in Antarctic nonliving resources.
258. For a discussion of the.interests that these industrial countries have in Antarctic
hydrocarbon deposits, see notes 214-19 and accompanying text supra.
259. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX(l)(f).
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enumerated in the Treaty.6 0
Under J.A.R.J., all states would continue to exercise their high
seas freedoms in the Southern Ocean. Moreover, since J.A.R.J.
would assume jurisdiction over the continental shelf of Antarctica,
UNCLOS IH would be unrestrained in extending the scope of its
jurisdiction to all waters and submerged lands of the Treaty area,
except the continental shelf, thus avoiding potential disruption of
the conference."'
The world community would continue to benefit from the de-
militarized status of Antarctica, which would remain unchanged by
J.A.R.J.12 The ecological efforts fostered by the Antarctic Treaty
would not be affected by J.A.R.J. and would continue to inure to
the benefit of all. Finally, interested non-Treaty and Treaty states
would have an opportunity to enter into a future treaty concerning
regulation of Antarctic krill.2 3
VIII. CONCLUSION
Any formulation of a practicable approach to the Antarctic
resource problem must be one that compromises the respective in-
terests of the three competing groups of states. No such approach,
standing alone, can possibly provide for the realization of all the
objectives which an ideal solution to the Antarctic resource problem
could theoretically achieve. The J.A.R.J. approach is no exception.
J.A.R.J., and indeed any prospective agreement on Antarctica, pre-
260. Id. art. IX(2). But see notes 65-68 and accompanying text supra (although several
acceding parties have applied for consultative status, only Poland has been accepted). One
commentator has stated:
The Treaty itself perpetuates . . . exclusivity. For, while it is open to accession
by any country that is a member of the United Nations, or has been invited to
join by all consultative parties, full consultative membership can only be attained
by an acceding party 'during such time as . . . fit] . . . demonstrates its interest
in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific activity there.' However, the
original twelve signatories remain consultative members whether or not they carry
out scientific research in Antarctica.
Mitchell, supra note 200, at 58.
If a J.A.R.J. declaration is to gain international recognition, the exclusivity practiced by
the original 12 parties to the Antarctic Treaty must be eliminated. The exclusivity must be
replaced by a nondiscriminatory mechanism which would grant full consultative membership
only according to the criteria defined in the Treaty. In addition, there must be a nondiscrimi-
natory application of the requirements for maintaining consultative status.
261. For a discussion of the interrelationship between sovereignty in Antarctica and
UNCLOS III, see notes 227-30 and accompanying text supra.
262. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 4, art. I.
263. Because of the high potential value of the Antarctic krill fishery, it is possible that
many states would participate in such a treaty. Since meaningful research might be under-
taken more quickly pursuant to a J.A.R.J. agreement, many states might accede to the
Antarctic Treaty and recognize J.A.R.J., if only to hasten responsible exploitation of this
much needed protein source.
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supposes a willingness on the part of claimants and nonclaimants
to compromise their diametrically opposed positions: Claimants,
who will be required to agree to a modification of their sovereignty
claims and the diversion of portions of the prospective royalties to
a trust fund under J.A.R.J., must appreciate the importance of
the international legitimization of their claims. It must be posi-
tively demonstrated that practical development of Antarctic claims
is impossible without such global recognition.
The international community, who will at least tacitly accede
to modified sovereignty claims under J.A.R.J., should realize that
the prospective benefits of J.A.R.J. exceed the present potential of
these states for independent development. Nondiscriminatory ac-
cess, trust fund receipts and a prospective overall benefit from an
increase in the size of the world's resource market as a result of
Antarctic production, are justifications for the compromise of fixed
antisovereignty goals by the international community. Since many
of the benefits of J.A.R.J. accrue without any active participation
or expense, the argument for compromise is formidable.
Under J.A.R.J., nonclaimant Consultative Parties would be
required to accede to modified sovereignty claims. However, since
these states have not asserted express claims, but have only asserted
a right to make claims, such a concession seems modest in light of
the consequent benefits. Under the recommended approach, non-
claimant Consultative Parties would share on an equal basis with
claimant states in the revenues which would be generated from the
resource leases. Additionally, the security of investment and explo-
ration assured by J.A.R.J., coupled with the guarantee of nondiscri-
minatory access to all nonliving Antarctic resources, should ensure
cooperation of the nonclaimant Consultative Parties.
The J.A.R.J. approach does not represent a final solution to the
Antarctic resource problem. The ultimate solution to the krill issue
and to other serious problems involved in the establishment of an
Antarctic nonliving resource regulatory mechanism will have to look
to the future for resolution. Yet, a declaration of Joint Antarctic
Resource Jurisdiction would provide the framework for the creation
of a practicable nonliving resource regulatory mechanism.2"' This
mechanism would ensure the location, assessment and exploitation
of Antarctic nonliving resources in a manner consonant with posi-
tive conservation and environmental principles.
The J.A.R.J. approach would not only provide a legal order
264. This regulatory mechanism will have to resolve such difficult issues as the establish-
ment of guidelines for hydrocarbon exploration and production, lease issuance, revenue shar-
ing, taxes and dispute settlement.
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relevant to future Antarctic resource activities, but would preserve
the Antarctic Treaty. It also offers a scheme which should be accept-
able to claimant and nonclaimant Consultative Parties and a suffi-
cient number of the remaining members of the international com-
munity to ensure its viability.
